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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines a dispute between Isaac Newton and Robert Hooke during the 
1670s over Newton’s “New theory about light and colour.” The controversy offers a 
fascinating window into the development of Newton's literary methodology for the 
presentation of his experimental facts. As such, I trace a transition from the genteel 
natural philosophy of Robert Boyle to the origins of modern scientific objectivity. While 
early modern science is often seen as the pursuit of obscure knowledge by natural 
philosophers in the privacy of their laboratories, such a view fails to recognize adequately 
the role science played in the public sphere. It was not merely a matter of 'facts' 
uncovered by 'scientists' in their laboratories, but also one of public representation of 
these facts and the knowledge which had been deduced from them. Newton challenged 
the authority of the Royal Society by suggesting and developing alternative conceptions 
of experimental credibility, mathematical certainty and dissemination. I contend that 
these alternative conceptions were a direct response by Newton to the controversies 
created by his optical theories. In order to avoid future disagreements, he tried to create a 
method of presenting his theories that would establish himself as authoritative. Thus, the 
dispute between Hooke and Newton played a key role that historians have hitherto failed 
to recognize in the shaping of the rhetorical methodology of science. By identifying and 
tracing the development of increasingly sophisticated literary technology, there is a great 
deal to be learned not just about seventeenth century natural philosophers but scientific 
writing as a whole. Through the close study of a specific dispute, such as between Hooke 
and Newton, we are able to learn more about the rhetorical methods used by scientists to 
establish their authority in regard to the knowledge they produce. 
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"It's hard to accept the idea that there cannot be an order in the universe 
because it would offend the free will of God and His omnipotence. So the 
freedom of God is our condemnation, or at least the condemnation of our 
pride." 
– Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose 
“If, instead of this remark, my father had taken the pains to explain to me, 
that the principles of Agrippa had been entirely exploded, and that a 
modern system of science had been introduced, which possessed much 
greater powers than the ancient, because the powers of the latter were 
chimerical, while those of the former were real and practical; under such 
circumstances, I should certainly have thrown Agrippa aside, and, with my 
imagination warmed as it was, should probably have applied myself to the 
more rational theory of chemistry which would have resulted from modern 
discoveries. It is even possible that the train of my ideas would never have 
received the fatal impulse that led to my ruin. But the cursory glance my 
father had taken of my volume by no means assured me that he was 
acquainted with its contents; and I continued to read with the greatest 
avidity.” 
– Mary Shelley, Frankenstein 
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Introduction 
No one better exemplifies the image of the solitary scholar than Isaac Newton 
alone in his Cambridge rooms conducting trials with prisms. In his optical experiments 
Newton refracted rays of light in order to understand its composition. He performed them 
unassisted and without witnesses. While Newton took his inspiration from the likes of 
Rene Descartes, Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke, his experimental programmes, 
techniques and conclusions were all his own. Indeed, at times historians of Newton give 
the impression that he worked entirely in a vacuum. Though an exaggeration, when 
Newton began his prism trials in the 1660s such a characterization is not entirely unfair 
as he had very little direct contact with the world outside of Cambridge. This changed in 
1672 when he submitted to the Royal Society the “New theory about light and colour,” 
which summarized the results of his optical studies. The short article touched off a 
firestorm that entangled Newton for much of the rest of the decade until Newton finally 
gave up responding to his critics. 
Today Isaac Newton (1642-1727) is one of the best known scientists in history. 
He is widely recognized for his genius and remembered primarily for his universal theory 
of gravitation. Furthermore, he was venerated during his own lifetime. He served as 
president of the Royal Society of London from 1703 until his death in 1727 and was 
knighted in 1704. By the eighteenth century his genius was essentially unchallenged in 
Britain and remained that way until the nineteenth century.
1
 The “New theory about light 
                                                 
1
 On optics after Newton see Geoffrey Cantor, Optics after Newton: Theories of Light in Britain and 
Ireland, 1704-1840 (Manchestor: Manchester University Press, 1983); Henry Steffens, The Development of 
Newtonian Optics in England (New York: Science History Publications, 1977). For a counter-narrative see 
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and colour,” however, was his first publication. Prior to this his direct contact with 
natural philosophers had been limited to his predecessor as Lucasian Professor of 
Mathematics, Isaac Barrows, and to London book-seller and amateur mathematician John 
Collins. In 1672 Newton was only thirty years old and had held his position as professor 
of mathematics at Cambridge for just three years. His career up until that point had not 
necessarily cast him for greatness. He famously had entered Trinity College in 1661 as a 
“subsizar,” forced to pay his way by performing menial labour for the fellows and 
wealthy students. This was despite the fact that Newton was heir to a manor and his 
mother’s income exceeded £700 per year. According to Newton biographer Richard 
Westfall, she “begrudged” her son further education at all.2 
While Westfall gave a great deal of attention to describing Newton’s private 
studies while a Cambridge undergraduate, he also observed that Newton did not 
outwardly establish himself as anything other than an odd and intensely reclusive figure 
during this time.
3
 After 1665, however, Newton became known to the first Lucasian 
Professor of Mathematics, Isaac Barrows, who regarded Newton as something of a 
protégé and did a great deal to advance Newton’s early career.4 Most significantly was 
Barrow’s support for Newton to replace him as mathematics professor in 1669. Thus, at 
the age of twenty-seven Newton became comfortably ensconced in a position that 
allowed him to continue his solitary contemplation. Other than the period of controversy 
                                                                                                                                                 
Casper Hakfoort, Optics in the Age of Euler: Conceptions of the Nature of Light, 1700-1795 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
2
 Richard Westfall, Never At Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), 72-3. 
3
 Westfall, Never at Rest, 74-5. 
4
 Westfall, Never at Rest, 202-3. 
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between 1672 and 1678, he remained quietly isolated until after the Principia came out in 
1687. 
As Lucasian professor, Newton was required to give regular lectures of at least 
one hour per week during the term.
5
 There is little evidence, however, that anyone 
attended them. Only three former Cambridge students claimed to have been instructed by 
Newton.
6
 Though he was required to lecture every term, Newton only did so one term per 
year and erratically at best. He was just as likely to leave Cambridge in the midst of the 
term as not.
7
 While obligated to deposit manuscript copies of ten lectures per year, he 
only did so four times through 1687 after which he ceased to lecture entirely, though he 
held his post fourteen more years in sinecure.
8
 Regardless of his future lapses in 
lecturing, in 1670 he began his inaugural series of lectures and chose optics as his 
subject. This was an eccentric choice since optics was not regarded as mathematics.
9
 
Newton defended his decision by arguing for a definition of mathematics broad enough 
to be able to cover nearly any subject that interested him at any given time.
10
  
A Cambridge professorship would seem to have been perfect for a man who 
apparently made only one acquaintance who could be described as a friend during the 
more than thirty years he spent at the university. Indeed, Newton spent most of his time 
as a student either alone in his rooms or on long, solitary walks around the campus.
11
 In a 
                                                 
5
 Alan Shapiro, “Introduction,” in The Optical Papers of Isaac Newton, Vol. I, 1670-72, edited by Alan 
Shapiro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 16. 
6
 Wesftall, Never at Rest 210. 
7
 Westfall, Never at Rest, 211. 
8
 Westfall, Never at Rest, 211. 
9
 Alan Shapiro, “Experiment and Mathematics in Newton’s Theory of Color,” Physics Today 37 (1984), 36. 
10
 Newton, Optical Papers, 439. 
11
 Westfall, Never at Rest, 74-6. 
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letter to John Collins Newton primarily expressed a desire to maintain the “serene 
liberty” that his quiet professorship had afforded him.12 Despite his disinclination toward 
publicity, however, he had begun to prepare his optical lectures for publication. When he 
submitted the “New theory about light and colour” for public scrutiny, he did so with the 
intention that it would herald the complete work that he anticipated would follow shortly. 
However, when he found himself faced with extensive criticism he quickly withdrew and 
did not publish again on optics until 1704. 
The “New theory” was a response to previous theories regarding the composition 
of light and colour, especially the one advanced by Robert Hooke (1635-1703) in 
Micrographia (1665). While Hooke had proposed a wave theory of light, Newton argued 
that white light was a composite of all colours. As Newton explicitly rejected Hooke’s 
theory, that Hooke took issue with it and responded quickly and aggressively is hardly 
surprising. It is important to recognize, however, that Newton’s theory was highly 
controversial and that dispute was not limited to Robert Hooke. In addition to Hooke, 
Newton defended himself against significant critical responses from Christiaan Huygens, 
Ignace Pardies and a group at Liège, led by mathematics professor and English Jesuit 
Francis Line, his student John Gascoines and theology professor Anthony Lucas. I have 
chosen to focus primarily on the dispute between Newton and Hooke because it offers the 
most interesting and heretofore underexplored implications for historians of early modern 
science. The controversy was a clash of incompatible models of natural philosophy due to 
conflicting conceptions of certainty and the ultimate purpose of the new science. Newton 
                                                 
12
 Isaac Newton to John Collins, 25 May, 1672, in The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, vol. I, 1661-1675, 
edited by Henry Turnbull (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 161. 
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was consciously attempting to reframe natural philosophy, yet this aspect of the dispute is 
seldom recognized.
13
 
There has been an unfortunate tendency for historians of Newton to detach him 
from the more general historiography of early modern natural philosophy. This likely 
largely has to do with the complexity and enormity of Newton’s philosophical work. 
Thus, much of the scholarship that has been done on Newton’s philosophy has been a 
product of intense zealots such as D.T. Whiteside, who devoted his entire career to 
editing for publication Newton’s mathematical papers.14 There has been a divide in which 
historians have generally either studied the work of Newton in and of itself or they have 
concentrated on the rise of “Newtonianism” in the eighteenth century.15 Those who have 
bridged the gap have often largely focused on his theology rather than his more difficult 
mathematical and scientific writings.
16
  
Newton exemplifies the “great man” narrative. Historians such as A. Rupert Hall 
fought to regard Newton as an exemplar of supreme intellect. To Hall the dispute with 
Hooke was not a battle between equals. Newton presented a theory of great genius and 
                                                 
13
 Alan Shapiro has argued that Newton was attempting to assert his own model of natural philosophy, see 
Alan Shapiro, Fits, Passions, and Paroxysms: Physics, Method, and Chemistry and Newton’s Theories of 
Colored Bodies and Fits of Easy Reflection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12-39. 
14
 Isaac Newton, The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton, vols. I-VIII, edited by D.T. Whiteside 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967-82). 
15
 For examples of the former see Richard Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics: The Science of Dynamics 
in the Seventeenth Century (London: Macdonald, 1972); Alan Shapiro, Fits, Passions, and Paroxysms. 
Niccolò Guicciardini, Isaac Newton on Mathematical Certainty and Method (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2009. For the latter see esp. Margaret Jacob, The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976). 
16
 For examples see Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in Newton’s 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephen Snobelen, "'God of Gods, and Lord of 
Lords': The Theology of Isaac Newton's General Scholium to the Principia," Osiris 16, (2001): 169–208. 
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Hooke was unable to understand it.
17
 Zev Bechler, however, ultimately redeemed 
Hooke’s role in the controversy.18 Instead of a misunderstanding brought upon by the 
confused and needlessly antagonistic Hooke, Bechler demonstrated that the dispute had 
greater significance than as an example of Newton’s superiority over his contemporaries. 
If Hooke did not comprehend the “New theory” it was because Newton demanded that 
his audience accept a paradigm which was in conflict with Hooke’s own and not because, 
as Hall implied, Hooke lacked the ability to follow Newton’s brilliance. Westfall went 
further than Hall and suggested that even in his youth Newton far exceeded his peers at 
Cambridge. According to an anecdote given by Westfall, Newton “read the logic before 
he got to Cambridge and found that he knew more than the tutor.”19 In another, Westfall 
quotes Newton’s niece Catherine Conduitt who alleged that even when playing checkers 
the young Newton was “unable to conceal his brilliance” and “if any gave him the first 
move” he was “sure to beat them.”20 The implication is clear; Newton was an individual 
of singular genius whose achievements were entirely a product of his brilliant mind. 
Of course, when Newton arrived at Cambridge in 1661 he was ignorant of the 
kind of experimental natural philosophy that was being done by the fellows of the newly 
founded Royal Society. Attention to Newton’s external influences has generally 
concentrated on his formative years during the early to mid-1660s while he was still a 
student at Cambridge. This has been aided by the presence of Newton’s Trinity Notebook 
                                                 
17
 A. Rupert Hall, Isaac Newton: Adventurer in Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1992), 123-6; see also 
A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, “Why Blame Oldenburg?” Isis 53 (1962): 482-91. 
18
 Zev Bechler, “Newton’s 1672 Optical Controversies: A Study in the Grammar of Scientific Dissent,” in 
The Interaction Between Science and Philosophy, edited by Yehuda Elkana (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1974). 
19
 Westfall, Never at Rest, 83. 
20
 Westfall, Never at Rest, 76. 
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which contains his notes on his early studies, thus giving historians a glimpse into both 
what he read and how he responded to it. However, this has left some historians with a 
predisposition to see Newton’s conception of natural philosophy as having been largely 
complete by the time that he was wrested out of obscurity with the publication of the 
“New theory” in 1672. Such a view disregards any suggestion of dialectic or further 
intellectual growth. J.E. McGuire and Martin Tamny, for instance, suggest that Newton 
read what works of natural philosophy he regarded to be important and took from them 
what bits he deemed to be significant. Thus, they presume that by the time he turned to 
substantial independent experimental research, he was moving largely in his own 
direction and had little to no further external influence.
21
  
While Newton certainly developed his own, unique experimental programme his 
early work was greatly inspired by the natural philosophers of the time. In the chronology 
recorded in 1726 by John Conduitt, Newton stated he had bought a prism in August 1665 
to “try some experiments upon Descartes book of colours” 22 However, according to A. 
Rupert Hall, “it is certain” that it was instead Touching Colours that had influenced 
Newton to begin his own optical trials.23 Indeed, Descartes had written no “book of 
colours.” Furthermore, Newton’s claim to have purchased his prism at the Sturbridge Fair 
was impossible as there had not been a fair outside of Cambridge in either 1665 or 1666 
due to plague. Though Newton might have gotten the date and author wrong, the origins 
                                                 
21
 J.E. McGuire and Martin Tamny, “Origin of Newton’s Optical Thought and its Connection with 
Physiology.” In Certain Philosophical Questions: Newton’s Trinity Notebook, edited by J.E. McGuire and 
Martin Tamny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 244. 
22
 Richard Westfall, Never at Rest: a Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), 157; A. Rupert Hall, Isaac Newton, Adventurer in Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1992), 41. 
23
 Hall, Isaac Newton, 41. 
9 
 
of the prism experiments do demonstrate Newton’s critical engagement in a broader 
experimental culture. 
Another example of Newton’s work being seen as largely developing in isolation 
can be seen in Alan Gabbey’s argument that the Principia was a treatise on mechanics. 
While Gabbey does recognize Boyle’s influence, he does so only to argue that: 
Boyle’s seemingly paradoxical coupling of natural philosophy and 
mechanical principles had been legitimated by [Isaac] Barrows and [John] 
Wallis, and was to find effective expression in Newton’s Principia.24 
 
Gabbey refers to Newton’s predecessors only to argue that Newton developed his own 
model of natural philosophy. Furthermore, Gabbey’s only reference to Newton’s optics 
was in relation to the optical lectures that Newton gave at Cambridge between 1670 and 
1672 and he did not mention the optical disputes at all.
25
 Peter Dear, however, has made a 
substantial challenge to the prevailing story. Recognizing the difference between English 
and Continental philosophical traditions during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
Dear has argued that Newton derived much of his method from the mathematical 
approach that was de rigueur amongst his continental peers.
26
 Rather than a method that 
was entirely a product of Newton’s own mind, he was trying to import aspects of 
mathematical philosophy to England while maintaining the experimental rigour promoted 
by the Royal Society. I contend that Newton’s philosophy did not emerge complete and 
ab intra. Instead, using the dispute between Newton and Robert Hooke as a case study, I 
                                                 
24
 Alan Gabbey, “Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: A Treatise on ‘Mechanics’?” 
in The Investigation of Difficult Things: Essays on Newton and the History of Exact Sciences in Honour of 
D.T. Whiteside, edited by P.M. Harmon and Alan Shapiro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
314. 
25
 Gabbey, 312. 
26
 Peter Dear, Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
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argue that the optical controversies of the 1670s played a fundamental role in shaping 
Newton’s natural philosophy, experimental method and rhetorical strategies for the rest 
of his career. 
The narratives described above generally presume that Newton’s theory was 
developed in the 1660s then presented to the public in its complete and final form. Alan 
Shapiro, however, has shown that this was not the case. The optical lectures that Newton 
was preparing for publication between 1670 and 1672 were “outdated” by 1675.27 In 
1672 Newton envisioned a mathematical theory of light and colour not unlike the one he 
later proposed for gravitation; however, he ultimately found that he was unable to make it 
work.
28
 By the time Newton published Opticks in 1704 it was a fundamentally different 
work than the manuscript suggested by his optical lectures. In Shapiro’s reading of the 
story, however, the controversies served only to disturb Newton’s “solitude and 
equanimity,” which caused Newton to delay publishing his theories long enough to 
conclude they were flawed.
29
 According to Shapiro, the dispute had little direct effect on 
the content of Newton’s optics. Yet, presumably the mere act of being forced to defend 
his theories and explain himself in greater detail would have forced Newton to evaluate 
his ideas in a way that he would not have otherwise. 
Much of Newton’s optics remained “bereft of a history” because, as Alan Shapiro 
has observed, they were “‘wrong’” thus making their study “unfruitful and unworthy of 
the great man.”30 Similarly, much of the history of the “New theory” has viewed the 
                                                 
27
 Alan Shapiro, “Introduction,” 21. 
28
 Alan Shapiro, “Experiment and Mathematics.” 
29
 Alan Shapiro, “Introduction, 20-1. 
30
 Alan Shapiro, Fits, Passions, and Paroxysms,” 3. 
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controversies, to quote Zev Bechler, “through the eyes of Newton, the victor of 
history.”31 There seems to have been an assumption that Newton’s genius was ultimately 
too great for him not to ‘win.’ Rob Iliffe, however, has analyzed the process by which 
Newton’s theory of gravitation became canon.32 Rather than simply accepting that 
Newton’s theory was adopted by his peers because it was ‘true,’ Iliffe has argued that it 
succeeded because of the promotional strategy that Newton adopted. The “New theory” 
has tended to be viewed from a rather pre-Thomas Kuhn conception of rationality. In his 
ground-breaking work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Kuhn shattered the 
last remains of the myth of teleological scientific progress. Prior to Kuhn, historians of 
science still tended to regard science as being a process of advancement from a less 
‘true,’ less ‘advanced’ past to the present continuing ad infinitum into the future. Instead, 
Kuhn posited that science operates under paradigms that serve to outline the kind of 
questions that scientists ask and both define and limit the kind of answers that they are 
able to obtain. Ian Hacking has argued that ‘traditional’ (pre-1960s) philosophy of 
science regarded science as being outside history, by which he meant that it was seen as 
inherently rational in its function, method and approach.
33
 Such a perspective cannot 
conceive to question why one theory would be successful as opposed to another because 
it assumes that there is a single ‘right’ theory that naturally wins out. What Iliffe has 
demonstrated with regard to the Principia was that Newton’s theory of gravitation won 
                                                 
31
 Bechler, “Newton’s 1672 Optical Controversies,” 124. 
32
 Rob Iliffe, “'Is He Like Other Men?' The Meaning of the Principia Mathematica, and the Author as 
Idol,” in Culture and Society in the Stuart Restoration: Literature, Drama, History, edited by Gerald 
Maclean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
33
 Ian Hacking, “The Rationality of Science After Kuhn,” in Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy 
of Science, edited by Robert Klee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 216-20. 
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assent not simply because of Newton’s brilliance, but because of the effective means by 
which it was presented and promoted to his audience. I argue that the difficulties Newton 
faced with the “New theory” played a fundamental role in shaping the approach he took 
with his future efforts that has not been adequately recognized. 
Scientific controversies, as Simon Schaffer has recognized, inherently involve a 
“contest about authority.”34 As such, the dispute between Hooke and Newton necessarily 
went beyond matters of fact. Those who challenged Newton questioned his authority as a 
purveyor of knowledge. Schaffer, however, was primarily interested in how Newton’s 
disputes demonstrate concerns of instrument and technique. He gave relatively scant 
attention to Hooke versus Newton since Hooke did not challenge Newton on either 
ground. Disputes play a key role in shaping rhetorical methodology as they force those 
involved to defend their approach as being the proper means obtaining useful 
knowledge.
35
 Schaffer saw the matter as exemplifying “how experimental instruments 
play a central role” as the “resources which experimenters deploy in their struggles to 
achieve authority.”36 The quarrel between Newton and Hooke is of interest because it was 
not about material technology; instead, both combatants were explicitly aware that their 
credibility was at stake. Rather than a matter of proper technique or suitable instrument, 
Hooke and Newton presented two conflicting views as to what the goal of natural 
philosophy ought to be and what Newton’s experimental facts meant.  
                                                 
34
 Simon Schaffer, “Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of Experiment,” in The Uses of 
Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences, edited by David Gooding, Trevor Pinch and Simon Schaffer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 67. 
35
 See for example, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and 
the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
36
 Schaffer, “Glass Works,” 67. 
13 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis my purpose is to provide a clear understanding of 
Isaac Newton’s optical theory in the context of seventeenth century natural philosophy. 
This is in order to give a strong foundation so that the analytical and theoretical 
arguments of the chapters that follow are clear. As such, I have chosen to begin by 
providing a relatively straightforward narrative of the dispute between Newton and 
Robert Hooke. This approach is a recognition that I am responding to a highly specific 
historical event with an argument grounded in a particular historiographical tradition. In 
order to prevent confusion, it is most expedient to begin by dealing with the “New 
theory” and the dispute between Newton and Hooke in and of themselves. Early modern 
science cannot be seen simply as the pursuit of obscure knowledge by natural 
philosophers in the privacy of their laboratories. Such a view fails to recognize 
adequately the role of science in the public sphere. That an experiment has been 
conducted is meaningless if it is not disseminated. Thus, in the first chapter I describe the 
process by which Newton made his doctrine public and sought to win assent from his 
audience. Meanwhile, in the second and third chapters I expand my focus in order to 
consider the broader implications that can be drawn from a study of the “New theory.” 
In the second chapter, I concentrate on what Steven Shapin called “literary 
technology”—the rhetorical strategy by which one attains assent—in order to argue that 
Isaac Newton consciously fashioned the “New theory” in an effort to convince his 
audience of its credibility.
37
 Shapin has made the counterintuitive suggestion that truth 
                                                 
37
 On literary technology see Steven Shapin, “Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary 
Technology,” Social Studies of Science 14 (1984): 481-520; Simon Schaffer, “The Leviathan of 
Parsontown: Literary Technology and Scientific Representation,” in Inscribing Science: Scientific Texts 
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itself can be regarded as a historical category. Rather than accepting the supposed 
conventional wisdom that “a social history of truth is not supposed to be possible,” 
Shapin demonstrated that truth is in fact constructed.
38
 Shapin has been a leading 
proponent of what Jan Golinski has called the “constructivist” outlook in the history of 
science. By constructivism he meant: 
That which regards scientific knowledge primarily as a human product, 
made with locally situated cultural and material resources, rather than as 
simply the revelation of a pre-given order of nature.
39
 
 
Of course, post-social history, post-cultural history, post-postmodernity, to argue that 
truth is a social product is no longer revolutionary. What Shapin sought to accomplish 
was to explain the mechanism by which something became “fact.” He took his lead from 
seventeenth century virtuoso, gentleman and natural philosopher par excellence Robert 
Boyle (1627-1791) and concluded that the answer lay in social status.
40
 Boyle argued at 
great length that the question at the heart of credibility was not what should one trust but 
whom.
41
 What Boyle determined and Shapin has thus argued was that seventeenth-
century natural philosophers primarily ascribed credibility with genteel status. When 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the Materiality of Communication, edited by Timothy Lenoir (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998). 
38
 Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 3. 
39
 Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science, 2
nd
 ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), xvii. 
40
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applied to Newton, however, the thesis rapidly becomes untenable. Newton was neither 
unambiguously genteel, nor did he equate social credibility with scientific. In A Social 
History of Truth, Shapin chose to approach seventeenth century natural philosophy 
broadly to ask “what is truth?” or at least what was truth to a certain community in the 
seventeenth century. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, on the other hand, have 
described the emergence of modern scientific objectivity during the nineteenth century.
42
 
In the development of Newton’s method we can see the transition between the genteel 
credibility of Boyle to the impersonal authority of nature that ultimately arose. This thesis 
serves to bridge the gap between the historiography of Boyle and that of the rise of public 
science in the eighteenth century. 
In the third chapter I use Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke and Isaac Newton as three 
separate, distinct models of natural philosophy in order to demonstrate an evolution from 
Boyle, who located authority in the person doing and reporting the experiments, to 
Newton, who sought to place the authority of his facts within the facts themselves. In 
1672 Newton attempted to provide a piece of experimental philosophy that fit within the 
traditional mold as exemplified by Robert Boyle, albeit with some idiosyncratic changes. 
When Newton found the Boylean method unsuited for the degree of certainty he wished 
to elicit, he adapted his approach. It is in this revision that an examination of Newton’s 
literary technology is embedded into the larger and more fundamental issues relating to 
objectivity and the location of authority that are the focus of the third chapter. Newton 
did not see his facts as credible because of his status, but because they were ‘objective’ 
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statements about reality. I conclude by describing the end of the controversies, which was 
provided by J.T. Desaguliers thirty years after they had begun.  In doing so I demonstrate 
that the optical controversies were more than a conflict of laboratory discovery or 
personality. Instead, Newton played a key role that has hitherto gone unrecognized by 
historians in the transition from a niche natural philosophy, from genteel diversion to the 
so-called objective, impersonal, “a-historical” scientific model of today. 
17 
 
Chapter One 
Newton v. Hooke, Round One: Optics, 1672 
 
“For the basic problem of philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of 
nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other 
phenomena from these forces.” 
– Isaac Newton, Principia 
 
 Isaac Newton’s “New theory about light and colour” was sent to Henry 
Oldenburg, secretary of the Royal Society, on February 6, 1672.
1
 Newton’s theory was 
the result of a series of experiments on optics conducted while he was still a student at 
Cambridge, approximately between 1665 and 1668, before he had become Lucasian 
Professor of Mathematics in 1669.
2
 It was his first attempt at publishing and would be his 
only foray into article writing as his later works all took the form of the monograph.
3
 
Newton proposed a corpuscular conception of light in which it was composed of rays of 
unequal refraction. White light was thus made of a mixture of all colors and each separate 
color was formed by the angle of refraction. For Newton, this was demonstrated by 
observing the refraction of a ray of light through a prism. When he performed this 
experiment, the spectrum was projected onto the wall and he noticed that each color 
appeared in its own specific position in the spectrum. Because each colour had a 
measurable angle, he was convinced of the possibility of a mathematical theory of light 
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and color similar to the approach he would eventually propose for universal gravitation.
4
 
Once he became committed to his ‘doctrine,’ he set out to formulate its mathematical 
foundation. These mathematical demonstrations would form the bulk of his optical 
lectures; however, Newton considered the proof be shown by a single experimentus 
crucis. In this chapter, I seek to describe the process by which Newton attempted to make 
his optical theory public and win assent for it. For the most part, I will focus on the 
narrative details of his first publication and the dispute with fellow experimental 
philosopher Robert Hooke that ensued.  
Isaac Newton was consciously trying to reframe natural philosophy into a model 
that possessed a more mathematical degree of certainty. While Peter Dear has considered 
the “New theory” to have been a failed attempt by Newton to meet the conventions of his 
time, I contend that, in fact, Newton actively sought to subvert said practices in order to 
promote his own model of mathematical natural philosophy.
5
 Dear focused on the 
narrative form of early natural philosophy. His argument was that natural philosophers 
described their experiments in a detailed account of an event that actually occurred, 
which Newton failed to do. Dear’s suggestion and its implications will be addressed in 
more detail in the second chapter. For the moment, the primary point I wish to make clear 
is that there were two major traditions at the time Newton was beginning his career: 
empirical experimental philosophy as represented by Robert Boyle and mathematical 
philosophy as practiced by continental natural philosophers. Rather than maintaining a 
strict division, Newton wished to expand on John Wilkins’ efforts to merge the two 
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methods into a “physico-mathematical” philosophy.6 Though Newton ultimately did not 
obtain the degree of assent he desired in 1672, he learned from the experience and was 
more successful when he published his theory of gravitation in 1687. Thus, the 
controversies he experienced in the 1670s played a crucial role in the development of 
Newton’s literary technology and his methodology. 
 In 1671 Isaac Newton was still largely unknown. He had, however, begun his 
climb out of academic obscurity as his name had become familiar to a few persons of 
significance. Most important for Newton’s career up until that point had been the support 
of his predecessor as Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge, Isaac Barrow, 
whose backing of Newton had been crucial to Newton obtaining the appointment at just 
twenty-seven years of age. Also key was Newton’s relationship with John Collins, whose 
wide circle of correspondence had begun to introduce Newton and his ideas to the world 
at large.
7
 With Newton’s transmission of his early mathematical treatise De analysi to 
Collins in London, “Newton’s anonymity began to dissolve.”8 Collins wrote diligently to 
Newton, posing mathematical questions and obtaining bits of Newton’s mathematical 
theories, most of which likely sailed well over Collins’ head.9 
 He may not have been able to understand much of Newton’s work, but Collins 
certainly was able to recognize Newton’s genius and the value he offered the world if he 
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would only divulge his work. Thus, Collins doggedly pressured Newton to publish, 
writing that: 
Your paines herein will be acceptable to some very eminent Grandees of the 
R Societie who must be made aquainted therewith, and forasmuch as Algebra 
may receive further Advancemt from your future endeavours.
10
 
Collins understood that publishing would force Newton to exit the scholarly obscurity of 
Cambridge and establish his philosophical credentials. He had, however, initially 
misjudged Newton who did not particularly wish to be thrust into the public eye. Indeed, 
Newton saw “not what there is desirable in publick esteem, were I able to acquire and 
maintaine it. It would perhaps increase my acquaintance, ye thing wch I chiefly study to 
decline.”11 Though he remained ambivalent to publishing, Newton eventually submitted 
to pressure and provided the Royal Society with a brief description of his optical work on 
February 6, 1672. The fallout from this would have major ramifications for the rest of his 
career and occupied much of Newton’s time for the next decade. 
The so-called crucial experiment was the key component of Newton’s “New 
theory” and was at the centre of the disputes that followed. An experimentum crucis was a 
term Robert Hooke had coined to describe an experiment that conclusively demonstrated 
the argument in question. While generally used to disprove a given theory, Newton 
positively employed the term to contend that the experiment he described showed his 
doctrine to be unimpeachable fact. It was significant that Hooke had created the term 
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“experimentum crucis.”12 Hooke's phrase superseded that of Francis Bacon, who had 
used “Instantiae crucis,” which translates literally as “instances of the crossroads.” It was 
only later that philosophy of science would make crucial experiments absolutely 
decisive.
13
 The transition is significant to explain the vehemence of Hooke's response. As 
Ian Hacking has explained: 
The picture is that two theories are in competition and then one single test 
conclusively favours one theory at the expense of the other. Even if the 
victorious theory is not proved true, at least the rival is knocked out of 
action.
14
 
By using the term “crucial experiment,” Newton strongly implied Hooke's theory had 
been disproved regardless of his later denials that he had intended any such thing. To 
disprove a hypothesis with a single example is much more likely than to prove one. At 
best Newton’s crucial experiment demonstrated that the “New theory” was highly 
probable. In order for it to have been a crucial experiment, Hooke argued, Newton would 
have had to demonstrate every possible counter to his theory were invalid, which was 
impossible to do with a single experiment. As far as Hooke was concerned Newton was 
misusing the term in order to make the “New theory” seem to be more strongly 
demonstrated than it actually was. 
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Newton’s experiment itself was simple enough (see Figure 1-1). Newton took two 
boards and placed them twelve feet apart from each other. He placed a prism at the 
window so that a ray of light was refracted and the spectrum was cast on the first board. 
 
Figure 1-1 
Isaac Newton’s diagram of the ‘crucial experiment’15 
 
A second hole was drilled into this board so that a beam of light would be able to pass 
through it and fall on the second board, which had another small hole in it. Behind the 
second board Newton placed another prism. Thus, the ray of light passed through both 
boards and two prisms before finally reaching the wall. He then slowly turned the first 
prism around in his hand, thereby changing the angles, and observed the results. What he 
saw was that the second refraction was “considerably greater” than the first. He 
concluded that:  
The true cause of the length of that Image was detected to be no other, then 
that Light consists of Rays differently refrangible, which, without any respect 
to a difference in their incidence, were, according to their degrees of 
refrangibility, transmitted towards divers parts of the wall.
16
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If all rays were equally refrangible, as was believed at the time, the image on the 
wall should have been nearly circular; instead, what Newton observed was that it 
was oblong. This led him to conclude he had found a “mathematical measure for 
color” in the degree of refrangibility.17 
The construction of telescopes had been one of Newton’s primary concerns in 
the latter half of the 1660s. Newton framed the “New theory” around the issue of 
the refracting telescope, which he had spent several years attempting to improve. 
The prism experiments, and the conclusions he had drawn from them, had caused 
him to realize the refracting telescope was fatally flawed; therefore, it could not 
obtain degree of accuracy he required. Ultimately, he decided that to continue to 
construct telescopes in the ordinary way was futile because “their improvement is 
not to be expected from ye well figuring of Glasses as Opticians have imagined.”18 
This was because the perfectibility of it was limited not by want of better lenses 
but: 
Because Light it self is a Heterogenous mixture of differently refrangible 
Rays. So that, were a glass so exactly figured, as to collect any one sort of 
rays into one point, it could not collect those also into the same point, which 
having the same Incidence upon the same Medium are apt to suffer a different 
refraction.
19
 
However, Newton “despaired not of their improvement by other constructions.”20 
Instead, he turned to reflection as a means of telescopic perfection. It was his ‘invention’ 
of the reflecting telescope that led to his election as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 
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1672.
21
 Zev Bechler has argued that the acclaim directed at Newton for his reflector was, 
in Newton’s mind, mislaid. The reflector was not the crucial result; instead, it was 
“intended as a test piece for his notions of colours and light.”22 The reflecting telescope 
was the “direct practical outcome of the new theory” and served to demonstrate the 
necessity of a new theory as he showed previous understandings of optics to be 
inadequate, as well as the superiority of his theory.
23
 With his new telescope, Newton had 
shown his theory to be imminently practical and useful. 
What Newton had submitted to the Royal Society comprised only a small part of 
his larger optical theory. The origins of his optical thought can be traced from the 
presence of a notebook he began to keep in 1664 that has been dubbed the Trinity 
Notebook by historians. In it he recorded the books he was reading, which enables 
historians to track the somewhat eclectic process of his self-motivated philosophical 
education. Newton’s first significant exposure to contemporary optics would seem to 
have come, unsurprisingly, from Rene Descartes.
24
 As well, Newton’s first investigations 
on refraction and notes on grinding lenses are found in an undated notebook that also 
includes his annotations on John Wallis’s Arithmetica infinitorum. The investigations 
                                                 
21
 While he was widely credited as the inventor of the reflector, Newton in fact took the idea directly from a 
number of earlier sources and was ‘merely’ the first to make one, see Zev Bechler, “’A Less Agreeable 
Matter’: The Disagreeable Case of Newton and Achromatic Refraction,” The British Journal for the 
History of Science 8 (1975): 101. 
22
 Bechler, “Less Agreeable Matter,” 104. 
23
 Bechler, “Less Agreeable Matter,” 102. 
24
 J.E. McGuire and Martin Tamny, “Origin of Newton’s Optical Thought and its Connection with 
Physiology,” in Certain Philosophical Questions: Newton’s Trinity Notebook, edited by J.E. McGuire and 
Martin Tamny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 244; For a description of Descartes’ 
optical experiments with prisms see A. Rupert Hall, All Was Light: An Introduction to Newton’s Opticks 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 9-11. 
25 
 
themselves were inspired by Descartes’s Dioptrics.25 Newton may have been thinking 
about optics prior to his reading of Descartes; however, it was from Descartes that he 
derived much of his early notions about light and colour.
26
 Sometime between late 1664 
and early 1665 Newton also read Robert Boyle’s Experiments and Considerations 
touching Colours (1663).  According to A. Rupert Hall, it was Touching Colours that 
inspired Newton’s prism experiments though in later years Newton suggested that the 
Descartes as the source.
27
 While Boyle’s work introduced to Newton experimental 
natural philosophy, Boyle did not proffer an optical theory. Shortly after reading 
Touching Colours Newton encountered Robert Hooke’s Micrographia (1665), which did 
propose an explanation of light. Newton studied Micrographia quite closely, as 
demonstrated by the fourteen printed pages of notes he took on it.
28
  
Hooke introduced Newton to a number of new phenomena. For Newton, the most 
significant of these phenomena was the way in which new colours were formed when 
light shone through or were reflected from a transparent plate. Newton saw this as being 
the results of differing angles of refraction. Despite Hooke’s priority, the phenomenon 
would come to be known as “Newton’s rings.”29 However, Micrographia was significant 
to Newton’s development for reasons beyond introducing him to a number of important 
optical phenomena. It motivated him to begin to develop more broadly his own 
                                                 
25
 McGuire and Tamny, 264. 
26
 McGuire and Tamny, 265. 
27
 Hall, Isaac Newton, 41. 
28
 Hall, Isaac Newton, 50. 
29
 Hall, Isaac Newton, 50. In the “New theory” Newton briefly acknowledged his debt to Hooke, see 
Newton to Oldenburg, 6 February, 1671/2, Correspondence, vol. I, 99. 
26 
 
experimental programme and to deviate from established thought. Hooke had proposed 
what was essentially an early wave theory of light, arguing that light was: 
A vibration or stream of pulses in an omnipresent aether, penetrating all 
bodies. White light, directly radiating from its hot source, consisted of a 
perfectly regular, uniform sequence of pulses (like a pure musical tone). 
When the sequence was disturbed, in a variety of ways described by Hooke, 
the non-uniform pulses created the appearance of colours.
30
 
In his notes, Newton preferred Descartes’ ideas to Hooke’s hypothesis. This is somewhat 
ironic considering the later antagonism between Newtonians and Cartesians. 
Robert Hooke responded quickly to Newton’s paper. Hooke was all but obligated to 
do so because Newton’s theory sought to refute his own. As Steven Shapin has 
demonstrated, a direct repudiation of another’s matters of fact was in violation of the 
genteel codes of conduct under which the Royal Society sought to operate.
31
 However, 
Hooke’s motivation for entering into controversy with Newton went well beyond simply 
a desire to defend his own theory. Hooke’s criticism of Newton focused primarily on a 
differing of opinion on the key concepts of hypotheses, conjecture, theory and certainty. 
He subscribed to a probabilistic notion of certainty based on the work of Robert Boyle, 
for whom he had served as an assistant before becoming curator of experiments for the 
Royal Society in 1662.
32
 Barbara Shapiro has suggested that out of the English Common 
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Law came a different means of assessing certainty than continental countries that 
followed Romano-Canon Law because the English system did not have mechanical rules 
for such assessments.
33
 The English common law differed from Romano-canon law in a 
number of ways, the most significant being how it dealt with proof. Roman law had a 
highly mechanical system in which witnesses were interviewed privately and then their 
testimony was submitted in written form to the judge who added up the evidence 
according to a set scale. If enough points were achieved, a matter was deemed to have 
been proven. Common law, on the other hand, had public trials and a jury of peers. Thus, 
English law emphasized testimony and it was the jurors’ responsibility to assess the 
credibility of witnesses as well as the force and effectiveness of their testament.
34
  
The English legal system allowed for differing levels of certainty. To be worthy of 
obtaining assent, a ‘fact’ did not have to be absolutely certain. A similar understanding as 
to what was sufficient proof for the judging of experimental facts was adopted by 
experimental natural philosophers in the seventeenth century. Shapiro has argued that, in 
its legal usage, a fact was only considered to be suitable to be believed after satisfactory 
evidence had been presented. A matter of fact was an issue placed before a jury involving 
whether or not an act had been performed by a certain person. A ‘fact’ was not an 
established truth, but an alleged act the occurrence of which was in contention.
35
 By 
giving assent to a matter of fact, one implicitly accepted the authority and credibility of 
the claimant. 
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Hooke was only one of a number of natural philosophers to dispute Newton’s 
theory. Amongst others, Newton received challenges from Christiaan Huygens, Ignace 
Pardies, Giovanni Rizzetti, and a group of English Jesuits at Liège, led by mathematics 
professor Francis Line, his student John Gascoines and theology professor Anthony 
Lucas. Newton attempted to respond to their various criticisms in order to convince them 
of the veracity of his theory. The disputes with Hooke, Huygens and Pardies all reflected 
what Bechler has described as Newton’s “dogmatic” approach.36 Meanwhile, the Liège 
and Rizzetti disagreements had primarily to do with experimental method and his 
opponents’ inability to replicate his crucial experiment.37 The debate between Hooke and 
Newton contains both the fullest expression of Newton’s thought and the most detailed 
Boylean criticism of it.  
While Hooke had a more personal motivation than Newton’s continental 
combatants, his criticisms were not simply a defence of his own theory. Hooke himself 
claimed that, “I doe assure him I am soe far from being concernd for any notion of 
Hypothesis of myne that I shall heartily thank any one that shews me better, or the 
defects of those.”38 His purpose, Hooke asserted, “'twas not to establish this or that 
hypothesis but to shew Mr. N. Corpuscular hypothesis of light and colours Not absolutely 
necessary.”39 An “Excellent Discourse of Mr Newton about colours and Refractions” 
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though the “New theory” might have been, Hooke was not convinced.40 He went on to 
reiterate his own theory: 
For all the expts & obss: I have hitherto made, nay and even those very 
expts which he alledged, doe seem to me to prove that light is nothing but a 
pulse or motion propagated through a homogeneous, uniform and 
transparent medium: And that colour is nothing but the disturbance of yt 
light by the communication of that pulse to other transparent mediums, that 
is by the refraction thereof: that whiteness and blackness are nothing but the 
plenty or scarcity of the undisturbed Rayes of light; and that two colours 
(then which there are noe more uncompounded in Nature) are nothing but 
the effects of a compounded pulse or undisturbed propagation of motion 
caused by Refraction.
41
 
 
As far as Hooke was concerned, Newton’s evidence was as much in favour of his own 
theory as it was of Newton’s and was not a refutation at all. Hooke contended that the 
“same phænomenon will be salved by my hypothesis as well as by his without any 
manner of difficulty or straining.”42 When Newton eventually responded to Hooke, he did 
not dispute this point. Indeed, he saw the “affinity” between his theory and Hooke’s to be 
a strength and not a weakness.
43
 Furthermore, Hooke added that he “will undertake to 
shew an other hypothesis differing from both his & myne, yt shall do the same thing.”44 
Hooke accepted that light was refracted as Newton described, what he “understood not” 
was “the necessity” of Newton’s explanation.45 In Hooke’s mind, Newton had gone too 
far in the assertion of his theory. Rather than proposing a hypothesis, as Hooke had done, 
Newton presented his theory as indisputable fact. 
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The crux of the dispute between Newton and Hooke is found in a passage that 
Henry Oldenburg had omitted from the published version in an effort to head off 
controversy. Hooke, however, had received an advance ‘review’ copy in which the 
offending passage remained.
46
 In it, Newton made some of his most dogmatic claims 
regarding a mathematical natural philosophy: 
In the last place I should take notice of a casuall expression wch intimates a 
greater certainty in these things then I ever promised, viz: The certainty of 
Mathematical Demonstrations. I said indeed that the Science of Colours was 
Mathematical & as certain as any other part of Optiques; but who knows not 
that Optiques & many other Mathematicall Sciences depend as well on 
Physicall Principles as on Mathematical Demonstrations: And the absolute 
certainty of a Science cannot exceed the certainty of its Principles. Now the 
evidence by wch I asserted the Propositions of colours is in the next words 
expressed to be from Experiments & so but Physicall: Whence the 
Propositions themselves can be esteemed no more then Physicall Principles 
of a Science. And if those Principles be such that on them a Mathematician 
may determin all the Phænomena of colours that can be caused by refractions, 
& that by computing or demonstrating after what manner & how much those 
refractions doe separate or mingle the rays in wch severall colours are 
originally inherent; I suppose the Science of Colours will be granted 
Mathematical & as certain as any part of Optiques. And that this may be done 
I have good reason to believe, because ever since I became first acquainted 
with these Principles, I have with constant successe in the events made use of 
them for this purpose.
47
 
In Hooke’s response he stated that he could “see noe reason why Mr. N. should make soe 
confident conclusion.
48
 Even more inappropriately, in another passage censured by 
Oldenburg, Newton had earlier stated in “New theory:” 
What I shall tell concerning them is not an Hypothesis but most rigid 
consequence, not conjecturing by barely inferring ‘tis thus because not 
otherwise or because it satisfies all phænomena (the Philosophers universall 
                                                 
46
 Alan Shapiro, “Experiment and Mathematics,” n. 2; Cf. Correspondence, vol. I, 190, n. 18. 
47
 Newton to Oldenburg, 11 June, 1672, Correspondence, vol. I, 187-8. 
48
 Hooke to Lord Brouncker, c. June, 1672, Correspondence, vol. I, 202. 
31 
 
Topick) but evinced by ye mediation of experiments concluding directly & 
without any suspicion of doubt.
49
 
Hooke sought to demonstrate that Newton’s experiment was “not an Experimentus 
crucis.”50 As Hooke explained:  
[Newton] doth not bring any argument to prove that all colours were 
actually in every ray of light before it has sufferd a refraction, nor does his 
experimentum Crucis as he calls it prove that those proprietys of colourd 
rayes, which we find they have after their first Refraction, were Not 
generated by the said Refraction…All he doth prove by his Experimentum 
Crucis is that the colourd Radiations doe incline to ye Ray of light wth 
Divers angles, and that they doe persevere to be afterwards by succeeding 
mediums diversly refracted one from an other in the same proportion as as 
at first, all wch may be, and yet noe colourd ray in the light before 
refraction; noe more then there is sound in the air of the bellows before it 
past through the pipes of ye organ.
51
 
 
Refuting the crucial experiment was not tantamount to repudiating Newton’s theory; 
instead, it was a rejection of the overly dogmatic language of Newton’s literary 
technology. 
As Simon Schaffer has shown, the continental disputes primarily had to do with 
experimental technique and proper instrumentation.
52
 Hooke, on the other hand, attacked 
Newton’s interpretation. Indeed, Hooke did “wholy agree wth him as to the truth of those 
he hath alledged.”53 Anthony Lucas challenged Newton’s theory because he was unable 
to replicate Newton’s experiment, a problem that Hooke did not share as he had 
successfully repeated it. However, Hooke concluded: 
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As having by many hundreds of tryalls found them soe, yet as to his 
Hypothesis of salving the phænomena of Colours thereby I confesse I cannot 
see any undeniable argument to convince me of the certainty thereof.
54
 
Hooke’s problem with Newton was not merely that Newton had challenged his own 
theory, but that he had done so with a degree of certainty that was anathema to the proper 
conduct of natural philosophy, stating that: 
How certaine soever I think myself of my hypothesis, wch I did not take up 
without first trying some hundreds of expts; yet I should be very glad to meet 
with one Experimentum crucis from Mr Newton that should divorce me from 
it.
55
 
Hooke denied the decisive role of the crucial experiment and argued that Newton’s 
explanation was no more demonstrated than his own: 
I agree with the observations of the 9
th
, 10 and 11
th
 though not wth his theory; 
as finding it not absolutely necessary, they being as easily and naturally 
explained & salved by my hypothesis…I doe not therefore see any absolute 
necessity to believe his theory demonstrated, since I can assure Mr Newton I 
cannot only salve all the Phænomena of Light and colours by the Hypothesis 
I have formerly printed and now explicate yt by, but by two or three others 
very differing from it.
56
 
Proper method was to perform a large number of different experiments and to report them 
in full. Newton, on the other hand, only hinted at the existence of a greater body of 
experiments while not bothering to include them in his report because “to continue the 
historicall narration of these experiments would make a discourse too tedious & 
confused.”57 Indeed, in Newton’s response to Hooke, he stated that he could have 
“acquainted him with my successes in the tryalls I have made of that kind” if Hooke had 
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“obliged me by private letter”58 Newton had failed to meet the conventions laid out by 
Boyle, who stressed that theories needed to be based on a large history of experiments 
designed specially to test them.
59
 
Newton repeatedly emphasized in the Liège dispute that the only relevant 
experiment was the ‘crucial’ one and their efforts were in vain because they failed to 
follow his method. If an experimenter could not make the experiments work “it must be 
due to their wilful incompetence rather than to subtle differences in technique.”60 Hooke, 
on the other hand, argued that he could provide a number of experiments that suggested 
an alternative explanation to light and colour. If they seemed “at first sight much to 
confirm Mr Newtons Theory,”61 ultimately: 
these experiments were not cogent to prove, that light consists of different 
substances or divers powders, as it were; but that these phænomena might 
be explained by the motion of bodies propagated.
62
  
 
Hooke did not presume to refute Newton’s theory; instead, he attempted to demonstrate 
that his own remained equally viable. 
Hooke had offended another principle of Newton’s when he stated that “nor would 
I understood to be said all this against his theory as it is an hypothesis.”63 This upset 
Newton because he understood ‘hypothesis’ much more strictly than did Hooke. For 
Hooke, hypothesis and theory were essentially interchangeable words, both of which 
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were only able to be proven to be probably, but not absolutely, true. After all, according 
to Hooke, “noething conduces soe much to the advancement of Philosophy as the 
examining of hypotheses by experiments & the inquiry into Experiments by 
hypotheses.”64 Newton, however, viewed theories as being the demonstrably true results 
of experiment while hypotheses were only conjecture. Much later, in the General 
Scholium of the 1713 edition of the Principia, Newton would famously write “hypothesis 
non fingo”—“I do not feign hypotheses”—and he would go on to explain: 
For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a 
hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on 
occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In 
this experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena 
and are made general by induction.
65
 
As Alan Shapiro has observed, to Newton “there were rigidly established, ‘true’ 
theories—like his theory of color—and there were hypotheses and the two must not be 
confused.”66 Thus, Newton quickly sought to clarify the distinction in his response: 
‘Tis true that from my Theory I argue the corporeity of light, but I doe it 
without any absolute positivenesse, as the word perhaps intimates, & make 
it at most but a very plausible consequence of the Doctrine, & not a 
fundamentall supposition.
67
 
Newton did not reject the value of hypotheses in natural philosophy; indeed, he made 
frequent use of them. For instance, in July, 1672 Newton wrote to Henry Oldenburg 
suggesting eight “Quaeries” for his opponents to investigate further.68 Newton believed 
that such experiments would demonstrate that his theory was “evinced” to him “not by 
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inferring tis thus because not otherwise” but “by deriving it from Experiments concluding 
positively & directly.”69 It was crucial to Newton that hypotheses be clearly indicated as 
such and set aside from the experimentally proven facts.
70
 He sought to emphasize this 
point, writing “And I wonder how Mr Hook could imagin that when I had asserted the 
Theory with the greatest rigor, I should be so forgetfull as afterwards to assert ye 
fundamentall supposition it selfe with no more than a perhaps.”71 
Robert Boyle regarded the role of the natural philosopher as performing the task of 
‘under-builder’ in which a foundation of an experimental history of a large number of 
different experiments would be built.
72
 Isaac Newton was unwilling to accept such a 
vague definition of certainty and preferred a position not dissimilar to that expressed by 
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes rejected Boyle’s method in which a fact was nothing “but sense 
and memory,” that “could not generate the kind of certainty appropriate to philosophical 
inquiries.”73 At the same time, however, Newton was dedicated to an experimental 
natural philosophy, something Hobbes had been fiercely against. Meanwhile, Boyle 
opposed mathematical natural philosophy because he thought it would restrict the size of 
the philosophic community. As well, he saw the mathematician’s quest for certainty as 
lacking “philosophic point, purpose and decorum.”74 Mathematics was inappropriate, he 
                                                 
69
 Newton to Oldenburg, 6 July, 1672, Correspondence, vol. I, 209. 
70
 The most clear example of this being the Queries of Opticks, which occur at the end, obviously separated 
from the rest of the book and clearly marked as hypotheses waiting to be ‘proven.’ 
71
 Newton to Oldenburg, 11 June, 1672, Correspondence, vol. I, 173-4. 
72
 Sargent, “Learning from Experience,” 58; Shapin & Schaffer, 66.  The example of this Boyle liked to use 
was that of William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of blood and the way it was eventually proven 
over Rene Descartes’ rival theory, see Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 80-4. 
73
 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 101; 146-7. 
74
 Shapin, Social History of Truth, 317. 
36 
 
believed, because it encouraged overly dogmatic assertions and philosophic systems 
building. Steven Shapin has observed that Boyle never attempted: 
To specify the shapes of different corpuscles, identify their geometric 
arrangements, quantify their states of motion…if one wished to claim that 
doing so is definitive of mechanical explanation, then one would have to 
conclude that Boyle never gave a mechanical explanation in his life.
75
 
This was in clear contrast to the approach taken by Newton, who did just such measuring 
and quantifying. 
 Robert Hooke’s initial response to Newton’s theory was sent to Oldenburg on 
February 15, 1672—just nine days after Newton had submitted his theory to the Royal 
Society. Newton, however, did not deign to respond to Hooke’s criticisms until June 11, 
and did so only after prodding from Oldenburg. The delay in Newton’s response was a 
clear violation of the polite conventions of natural philosophy. Oldenburg wrote to 
Newton in April gently suggesting that “It would be well if your answer to Mr Hooks 
objections could be ready.”76 Even then it was another two months before Newton had an 
answer prepared. It is possible that Newton had found Hooke’s comments particularly 
distasteful and had hoped to avoid responding at all. He had, after all, replied quickly to 
the other criticisms he had received.
77
 A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall regarded 
Newton’s response to Hooke as having been a masterful refutation of Hooke’s objections. 
As far as Hall and Hall were concerned, Hooke’s theory was “destroyed.”78 Seeing as 
Newton failed to end the dispute, such an interpretation credits him too much. The 
argument could be made that Hooke had too much invested in the dispute to give in. 
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Moreover, Hooke was hardly one for admitting defeat.
79
 Certainly, Hall and Hall have 
pointed to the “beautiful tautology” contained in Hooke’s claim to “heartily thank anyone 
who shews me better” as Hooke always saw his own hypotheses to be “better and he 
defended them bitterly.”80 Yet, Newton remained in controversy with a number of his 
continental challengers as well. The dispute was not definitively brought to a close until 
1714, and it was Newton’s disciple, J.T. Desaguliers, rather than Newton, who provided 
the demonstrations that did so.
81
 
 Newton opened his response to Hooke with the confident assertion that he had 
found nothing in Hooke’s Considerations that he “conceived might not wthout difficulty 
be answered.”82 He began his attack by defending his decision not to include the entirety 
of his optical trials and to take Hooke to task for not requesting descriptions of the full 
trials via private letter.
83
 He then moved on to the “Theoretique part” in which he 
vigorously asserted his views regarding hypotheses and certainty. While Newton’s 
Trinity Notebook was fairly critical of Hooke’s theory, in his June 11 letter, Newton 
sought to be somewhat more charitable and emphasized that his theory and that of Hooke 
were not entirely incompatible. Newton “understood not why Mr Hook should endeavour 
so much to oppose it. For certainly it hath a much greater affinity with his own 
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Hypothesis then he seems to be aware of.”84 The language used by Newton would seem 
to indicate that he was concerned with more than a simple defence of his theory in itself; 
instead, he saw Hooke as challenging his experimental model itself. This becomes 
especially clear when contrasted with Simon Schaffer’s discussion of the way in which 
Newton dealt with the continental disputes. In Newton’s controversy with the Italian 
natural philosopher Giovanni Rizzetti, what was on the line was the veracity of the facts 
themselves as Rizzetti was unable to replicate Newton’s experiment.85 The facts were 
never a matter of contention for Hooke; instead, it was the interpretation that was in 
question. 
Much of the reason why Hooke and Newton were unable to resolve their dispute 
was because they essentially spoke entirely different languages. This can be seen 
especially clearly in Newton’s reply to Hooke. Newton expressed amazement that Hooke 
was “so much concerned for an Hypothesis, from whome in particular I most expected an 
unconcerned & indifferent examination of what I propounded.”86 According to Zev 
Bechler, “what [Newton] could not see was that no one disputed the truth of the facts or 
the adequacy of the hypotheses.”87 Bechler was primarily concerned with rescuing Hooke 
and the others who disputed with Newton from the condescension of Newtonian scholars 
who tended “to view the situation through the eyes of Newton, the victor of history.”88  
Thus, Newton’s opponents such as Hooke were given an “absurd” lack of respect by 
historians who wrote of these opponents “failure to grasp” the “depth” of Newton’s 
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theory. For example, Hall and Hall dismissed Hooke as trying to “refute what he did not 
understand.”89 Bechler rightly corrected such a glib view toward Hooke and others, like 
Huygens and Pardies, who had taken issue with Newton’s claims. All were highly 
accomplished and their responses clearly indicate they understood Newton’s theory 
perfectly well. However, Bechler went too far in the other direction in his assertion of 
Newton’s supposed “failure to grasp the exact import of the dispute.”90 It would have 
been equally unlikely that Newton would not have been able to understand the position of 
his opponents. Newton was “well acquainted with classical rhetorical techniques.”91 
Certainly he would not have been ignorant of the anti-dogmatic stance of Robert Boyle 
upon whom Hooke, Huygens and Pardies based their criticisms.  
As the Trinity Notebook has shown, Newton was quite well versed in the 
conventions of natural philosophy. By viewing the dispute through the lens of literary 
technology, I suggest that Newton was consciously trying to reframe natural philosophy 
into a model that possessed a more mathematical degree of certainty. That Isaac Newton 
was attempting to devise and promote a more mathematical conception of certainty and 
natural philosophy is hardly a novel argument; however, while Newton scholars have 
detailed Newton’s mathematical philosophy, there has been a tendency not to take the 
argument outside of the narrow context of Isaac Newton himself.
92
 As Newton was the 
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central figure of eighteenth century natural philosophy, it is essential to integrate him 
more successfully into the historiography of the scientific method. It was not that Newton 
was unable to understand the arguments made by Hooke, nor that Hooke was unable to 
understand Newton, but that they viewed natural philosophy quite differently and were 
trying to accomplish incompatible things. Hooke was seeking to defend his hypothesis, 
albeit aggressively, and to modify Newton’s dogmatic tone. Newton, however, had 
intentionally expressed himself in such a manner because he was trying to reconstruct 
how certainty was conceived by the experimental community. Therefore, neither Hooke 
nor Newton could have possibly accepted the other’s arguments. To do so would have 
been to admit the entire foundation for their systems of natural philosophy were flawed. 
When the dispute is re-framed through consideration of literary technology a 
strong argument can be made that Newton knew exactly what the import of the dispute 
was. It was neither a matter of Newton being unable to grasp the arguments of his 
opponents nor his opponents being unable to understand the depth of Newton’s theory. 
Instead, Newton was consciously attempting to assert his new model of natural 
philosophy, while his opponents sought to defend the status quo. It is not that he was 
ignorant of or unable to understand the Boylean position, but that he was trying to 
reconstruct natural philosophy in accordance with his ‘doctrine.’ Where Bechler has 
interpreted Newton as failing to comprehend the argument of his opponents, I would 
suggest that Newton was instead seeking to steer the conversation away from Boylean 
language and back toward the mathematical principles he had proposed in his original 
paper. 
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This chapter has sought to provide an overview of the dispute between Hooke and 
Newton. As well, I have aimed to demonstrate the unique aspects of this particular 
controversy in comparison to the others in which Newton had found himself following 
the publication of the “New theory” in order to explain why I have focused my study on 
the single dispute between Hooke and Newton. In the second chapter, I will turn from the 
more straightforward narrative that has been given thus far to delve more deeply into an 
analysis of Newton’s literary technology. Part of the reason why Newton’s theory caused 
so much controversy was that he had blithely promoted as self-evident when, as A. 
Rupert Hall has noted, Newton “had gradually accustomed himself to a new language of 
optical theorization, which his critical readers failed to understand.”93 Newton’s theory 
was based on what was essentially an intuitive leap. Newton was seeking to move natural 
philosophy toward what Peter Dear has called “physico-mathematical philosophy” or 
“mixed mathematics.”94 Therefore, I will investigate more broadly the philosophical 
context in which Newton was working and provide a more comprehensive analysis of 
Newton’s literary technology. 
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Chapter Two 
“Not an Hypothesis but most rigid consequence”: Isaac Newton’s Literary 
Technology 
 
“Pavlov believed that the ideal, the end we all struggle toward in science, 
is the true mechanical explanation. He was realistic enough not to expect it 
in his lifetime. Or in several lifetimes more. But his hope was for a long 
chain of better and better approximations. His faith ultimately lay in a pure 
physiological basis for the life of the psyche. No effect without cause, and 
a clear train of linkages.” 
– Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow 
 
A favorite apocryphal story for historians of Newton is that of the witty 
Cambridge undergraduate who, upon seeing Newton walk past, quipped, “there goes the 
man who wrote the book that neither he nor anyone else can understand.” The Principia 
outlined Newton’s theory of gravitation in the most stark, mathematical terms 
imaginable. He refused to make any concessions to his readers and instead sought to 
address an audience limited to the most advanced mathematicians in Europe.  This was a 
conscious response by Newton to the controversies that the “New theory about light and 
colour” had engendered. As Rob Iliffe has argued, the obscurity of the Principia was part 
of Newton's strategy for self-fashioning and was intended to secure his authority.1 It was 
difficult for opponents to develop detailed criticisms of a theory they lacked the necessary 
skill to comprehend. However, Newton's process of self-fashioning began much earlier 
than the 1680s. Iliffe concentrated on the means by which Newton attempted to construct 
his public persona and not on the rhetorical strategies he adopted in his writing to secure 
his credibility. Furthermore, Iliffe has focused primarily on the period of the Principia, 
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therefore, he has failed to give full weight to the significance of the “New theory” to the 
development of Newton's literary technology.  
 The “New theory” demonstrates some of the ways in which dissemination is at 
the heart of science. In the words of Bruno Latour, “To convince someone that an 
experiment has succeeded, that a technique is effective, that a proof is decisive, there 
must be more than one actor.”2 Latour has rejected what he called the 'diffusionist' 
model; one that attributed the “power to revolutionize society” to individual genius.3 The 
argument upon which this thesis rests is that science is a collaborative enterprise. There is 
no such thing as the solitary genius. Fundamental to dissemination is the scientific 
publication. In this chapter I look to address the issue of Isaac Newton’s literary 
technology in order to define his scientific method, how it fit in comparison to his 
contemporaries Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. In doing so I suggest key ways in which 
Newton’s approach developed and changed over time, consequently shaping eighteenth 
century natural philosophy. 
There has been no shortage of publications on the subject of science in the public 
sphere; however, it has tended to regard the public sphere in terms of display or 
commodification. The more rare studies that focus on publication fail to do so in a 
manner that recognizes the public sphere or do so in a way that is too limited. Peter Dear 
has argued that “an account of an experiment is an inseparable part of its meaning.”4 
Indeed, “An experiment, therefore, is only an experiment if it appears as one in scientific 
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discourse, or might well do so given the context in which it was created.”5 Steven Shapin, 
meanwhile, has suggested three separate, but overlapping or “embedded,” technologies in 
his analysis of Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiments. These technologies were: material 
(“embedded in the construction and operation of the air-pump”); literary (“by means of 
which the phenomena produced by the pump were made known to those who were not 
direct witnesses”); and social (“which laid down the conventions natural philosophers 
should employ in dealing with each other and considering knowledge-claims”).6 In this 
chapter I will expand on his concept of ‘literary technology,’ which Shapin defined as 
“the expository means by which matters of fact were established and assent mobilized.”7 
The production of knowledge and its communication are not the distinct activities 
they are usually regarded to be; instead, “speech about reality is a means of generating 
knowledge about reality, of securing assent to that knowledge, and of bounding domains 
of certain knowledge from areas of less certain standing.”8 They are “crafted to make 
representations of the natural and social worlds stand independently of their authors.”9 In 
studying literary technology, “we are not, therefore, talking about something which is 
merely a ‘report’ of what was done elsewhere; we are dealing with a most important form 
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of experience and means for extending and validating experience.”10 Shapin’s work on 
literary technology has focused primarily on Robert Boyle to whom, I argue, Newton was 
consciously responding when he sought to develop his own literary technology. Thus, it is 
necessary to begin by describing Boyle’s model. 
 Boyle's papers were always left to be published in a state of chaos and 
incompleteness; a fact for which he constantly apologized.11 Touching Colours, he 
explained, was “written to a private Friend” and was done so “by snatches, at several 
times, and places” meaning he often did not have with him what he had already written.12 
Shapin has argued that such language by Boyle was not merely a reflection of 
disorganization, but was part of a conscious strategy for credibility.13 Jan Golinski has 
contended that Boyle intended to establish authoritative foundations for subsequent 
discourse on chemistry.14 Boyle's “meta-discourse,” to borrow John Harwood's term, 
established an aura of authenticity and immediacy.15 His experiments were to be seen as 
having been actually performed and recorded without editorializing by Boyle as they had 
occurred.16  
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The development of Boyle's literary technology has a good deal in common with 
similar changes to how history was being written in the seventeenth century. Barbara 
Shapiro has argued that there was a correlation between early modern historical writing 
and natural philosophy. Historians were engaged in debate as to whether they should 
provide only a straightforward narrative of facts or if they “were obligated to consider the 
causes and explanations.” The general trend by the seventeenth century, Shapiro has 
argued, was to prefer “’bare narration’ of ‘fact.’”17 Boyle viewed his experimental reports 
to be histories of discrete events. It is perhaps, therefore, unsurprising that Boyle adopted 
historical conventions in his writings. In doing so Boyle challenged the common view 
that philosophy was intrinsically about causal explanations. While the eventual goal of 
the new science was to uncover causes, he did not believe that enough was known about 
the natural world for universal theories or philosophic systems to be meaningfully 
developed. 
 For an analysis of Boyle's literary technology, Steven Shapin's model will be 
adopted.18 The central tenet of Shapin's thesis is that of the role of witnessing. Shapin and 
Simon Schaffer coined the term “virtual witnessing” to describe the process by which the 
witnessing experience was “multiplied.”19 The empirical, experiment-driven natural 
philosophy of Robert Boyle required a technology that ensured “the things had been done 
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and done in the way claimed.”20 Such a technology was particularly important in the case 
of Boyle's air-pump experiments because the air-pump was both notoriously difficult to 
operate and expensive to build, meaning that direct access to it was highly limited. 
Indeed, there likely was only seven air-pumps in existence in the mid-1660s.21 Therefore, 
Boyle needed to develop a reliable means to establish the authority of his matters of fact 
without the expectation of his readers being able to replicate or directly witness his 
experiments. 
 Virtual witnessing was intended to overcome the problem of access by recreating 
the experiment via literary means. Thus, according to Shapin and Schaffer, Boyle's 
notorious verbosity was an intentional strategy. Their argument has, however, been 
criticized by Michael Hunter as presenting a picture of Boyle as being far more in control 
of his “personality development” than Hunter has deemed appropriate.22 While it was 
likely true that Boyle's literary technology and scientific method was shaped partly by his 
personality rather than being an entirely conscious stratagem, it would be unfair to Boyle 
not to recognize that he did deliberately shape his method in order to enhance his 
authority. Boyle's publications are perhaps most notable for the disorder of their 
presentation and the exhaustive details included in the narrative, both of which had 
specific rhetorical advantages. The benefit of his approach was that it leant greater 
credibility to Boyle as having reported on his experiments as they happened rather than 
having edited them into a fictive narrative constructed post facto to prove his conclusions.  
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Boyle went so far as to include failed experiments in order to demonstrate that he was 
providing his readers with the unabridged truth.23 To quote Boyle, “I think it becomes one 
that professes himself a faithful Relator of Experiments, not to conceal” experimental 
failures.24 Of course, in practice Boyle was highly selective in his use of such failures. 
 Boyle's defence of including failed experiments came in conjunction with one 
such notable experiment. In the process of conducting his air-pump trials, he had 
developed a theory of 'cohesion' relating to the idea that if two well-polished marble discs 
were laid on each other they would “stick so fast together” that when one lifted the top 
disc the bottom would be lifted as well.25 Boyle speculated: 
A probable cause of this so close adhesion we have elsewhere endeavour'd 
to deduce from the unequall pressure of the Air upon the undermost stone; 
For the lower superficies of that stone being freely expos'd to the Air is 
press'd upon by it, whereas the uppermost surface, being contiguous to the 
superiour stone, is thereby defended from the pressure of the Air which 
consequently pressing the lower stone against the upper, / hinders it from 
falling, as we have elsewhere more fully declar'd. Upon these grounds we 
conjectur'd that in case we could procure two marbles exactly ground to 
one another; and in case we could also sufficiently evacuate our Receiver, 
the lower stone would, for want of the wonted and sustaining pressure of 
the Air, fall from the upper.26 
 
However, Boyle was unable to carry out an experiment that demonstrated his hypothesis. 
He found that he could not obtain marbles smooth enough that they would stay together 
for more than a few minutes. When he was finally able to get them to stick together, the 
marbles failed to separate the way his theory argued that they would.27 Because the pump 
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leaked, however, Boyle was able to contend the experiment be accounted unsuccessful 
without abandoning the hypothesis itself. By including such accounts of experimental 
failure, Boyle thereby constructed a literary identity of himself as credible, trustworthy 
and modest. The implication was that his matters of fact should be accepted by his 
audience because if there was a credible reason why they should not have been he would 
have given it in the narrative. 
 A further example of Boyle's literary technology in action can be found with his 
Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours (1664). Unlike his experiment with 
marbles, Boyle was careful to present his work on colours without theory. It was the:  
Design of this Treatise is to deliver things rather Historical than 
Dogmatical, and consequently if I have added divers new speculative 
Considerations and hints, which perhaps may afford no despicable 
Assistance towards the framing of a solid and comprehensive 
Hypothesis.28 
 
He was providing his readers with a report of experiments carried out from which they 
would be able to begin to draw some conclusions regarding the nature of colours. Rather 
than a “compleat Fabrick, or so much as Modell,” Boyle intended “only to bring in 
Materials proper for the Building” of the experiments.29 This was consistent with Boyle's 
opposition to 'universal' theories, which he viewed as overly dogmatic and tantamount to 
‘Cartesian’ systems building.30  
 Touching Colours was emblematic of Boyle's modest method. He opened with a 
string of apologies for the state of the manuscript. The experiments could have been 
                                                 
28
 Boyle, “Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours,” in Works, vol. IV, 5. 
29
 Boyle, “Touching Colours,” in Works, vol. IV, 6. 
30
 Shapin, Social History of Truth, 317. 
50 
 
“deliver'd in fewer words.” It was “written to a private Friend” in “snatches.” The 
experiments were not arranged to their best advantage, therefore, “some connections and 
consecutions of them might easily have been mended.” Having conducted the 
experiments over an extended period of time and in various locations, some of his notes 
had become misplaced. Boyle did not have the luxury of time, he argued, to organize and 
prepare his experiments for publication to the degree he would have liked.31 He hoped 
that he would be “excused by those that both know, how nice divers experiments of 
Colours are” if he were “to insist long upon the circumstances of a Tryall” as he “was not 
barely to relate them, but so as to teach a young Gentleman to make them.”32 The new 
science, after all, depended on the notion of replication and accessibility; therefore, it was 
essential that experiments be described in a way conducive to reproduction. Lastly, he 
apologized for not being more “solicitous” to divide his treatise more nicely than into 
three parts. Boyle “contented” himself “with this easie Division of my Discourse” as he 
“did not think it so necessary to be Curious about the Method or Contrivance of a 
Treatise.”33 
 In Touching Colours Boyle sought primarily to describe the experiments he had 
carried out. The aim was not to give his reader a completed theory of colour, but to 
demonstrate some of the properties possessed by colours and to show a number of 
interesting phenomena relating to them. That Newton was inspired to take up the study of 
colours after reading Touching Colours is evidence that Boyle succeeded in his purpose. 
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The intent of Boyle's narrative was to describe discrete events as they had occurred in 
terms that would allow his readers to understand how the experiment worked so that they 
would be able to repeat it should they wish. Of course, in the case of his air-pump 
experiments such replication was not readily possible for most due to the limited access 
to air-pumps. Shapin and Schaffer have argued that Boyle sought to overcome this 
problem through the exhaustiveness of his account, which they termed “virtual 
witnessing.”34 Boyle’s style was intended to involve “the production in a reader’s mind 
of such an image of an experimental scene as obviates the necessity for either direct 
witness or replication.”35 
 The inclusion of a complete narrative that often went well beyond the specifics of 
the experiment itself to include general information regarding the context, setting and 
environment in which the experiment had occurred not only gave greater authenticity to 
the account—it extended the witnessing process. Boyle obsessively included 
“circumstantial details” in his reports. This was because, as Peter Dear has observed, 
“The procedure could always be repeated; the event could never be.”36 Baconian natural 
philosophers such as Boyle “scorned thought experiments and insisted upon both accurate 
and circumstantial reporting.”37 He was troubled by those who published and built upon 
“Chymical Experiments, which questionless they never try'd” who “have been content 
rather to beleeve what they so boldly Affirm, then be at the trouble and charge, to try 
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whether or no it be True.”38 For instance, Boyle pointed to Blaise Pascal’s treatise “On 
the aequilibrium of liquors” in which Pascal had reported trials that he “could not have 
performed” because they required instruments of an exactness beyond what a tradesman 
would have been able to obtain.39 Experiments needed to be actually performed because: 
Experiments that are but speculatively true, should be propos'd as such, 
and may oftentimes fail in practise; because there may intervene divers / 
other things capable of making them miscarry, which are overlook'd by the 
Speculator, that is wont to compute only the consequences of that 
particular thing which he principally considers.40 
 
Furthermore, Boyle's detailed descriptions served to remove judgment from his accounts. 
He was reporting matters of fact and not constructing experiments to demonstrate a 
preconceived hypothesis. Boyle sought to make no distinction between “natural history” 
and the “experimental;” because “each was, in the same way, given as an experience 
defined in space and time by an actor, the observer.”41 Boylean natural philosophy was 
rooted in the discrete event. 
 Robert Hooke had a unique view of the process. He was Boyle's assistant during 
the period when the air-pump experiments were carried out. When he later criticized 
Newton's “New theory,” Hooke did so using language clearly influence by Boylean 
ideology. Hooke, however, did not have Boyle’s inherent advantage of status. Indeed, 
Hooke’s contemporaries did not regard him as a natural philosopher, but instead as a 
“mechanic.”42 Therefore, it would also seem likely that he would have had to adjust his 
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method in order to overcome this 'deficiency. While Hooke had an obvious weakness 
compared to Boyle, he also had an advantage over Newton. Hooke held the position of 
curator of experiments for the Royal Society, thus he was in the position of publicly 
performing experiments before an elite audience. As Steven Shapin has observed, 
“Hooke lived on a public stage.”43 Though Hooke maintained his personal credibility 
with fellow members of the Royal Society by regularly demonstrating experiments to 
them, the Society’s leadership was “increasingly aware of print as a way to establish, 
enhance, and protect its public image.”44 It was for such ends that Hooke wrote 
Micrographia (1665).  
Steven Shapin has regarded science as consisting of three embedded technologies. 
Along with literary technology he included material technology, which embedded the 
construction and operation of experimental instruments and social technology, which 
“laid down the conventions natural philosophers should employ when dealing with each 
other and considering knowledge claims.”45 While Newton relied on his audience 
accepting his written account, to a large extent Hooke’s authority depended very little on 
his written work; instead, he primarily employed social technology.46 In contrast to 
Newton, Hooke “linked the issue of credibility to the rhetorical utility of statements that 
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showed, rather than told, the scientific facts.”47 While he primarily depended on social 
and material technology for his credibility, the three technologies cannot be seen as 
distinct; instead, “each embedded the others.”48 Indeed, with Hooke the three 
technologies overlapped much more so than was the case with Newton as Hook’s treatise 
included substantial and carefully crafted illustration intended to visually demonstrate his 
observations.49  
Considering my focus on Hooke's response to Newton's method and language, it 
is important to examine briefly Hooke's literary technology. In this section, therefore, I 
will look at Hooke's approach in Micrograph. As Hooke triumphantly proclaimed, with 
telescopes and microscopes, nothing was “so far distant” or “too small” to “escape 
inquiry.”50 Thus, much like Boyle's experiments on colour and light, Hooke primarily 
sought to introduce his audience to new phenomena. At the same time, however, Hooke 
was far more willing to proffer explanatory theory than Boyle had been. Hooke tried to 
distinguish between his “methodological accomplishments,” which he saw as belonging 
“to the community” and his “conjectures” that “were his own.”51 In doing so he provided 
new matters of fact while at the same time he was able to assert a causal theory without 
presenting a doctrine which was overly dogmatic. 
Micrographia contained a total of sixty “observations” made by Hooke using 
optical instruments. As Hooke argued during his dispute with Newton, it was essential 
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that a large body of experiments be performed and made available to the audience.52 The 
experiments given in Micrographia were a diverse product of the eclectic nature of 
Hooke's interests. From a Boylean point-of-view, however, this eclecticism was a virtue. 
For Boyle, the primary role of natural philosophers was to build up a large body of 
experimental observations about nature. Boyle's method “inverted” the order of discovery 
and proof held by “traditional” philosophers who began with speculations about universal 
causes. While “for most of the century and in most places...reliance on isolated testimony 
was irrelevant because prepackaged philosophical universality was the norm,” Boyle 
argued that philosophers should “first compile a vast amount of information about natural 
effects in order to discover 'how things have been or are really produced.'”53 To begin 
from universals would inherently be to bias the conclusions. This approach was 
influenced by the ancient distinction between “historia,” which “dealt with particulars” 
and “philosophy,” which dealt with “universals.”54 As Hooke limited Micrographia to 
sixty observations, it is clear that it was the dogmatic priority given to the crucial 
experiment by Newton to which Hooke objected and not the fact that Newton failed to 
include a description of every experiment he had carried out. It was appropriate to 
abridge the description into something manageable as long as the reader was given a 
broad enough sample of experiments and the conclusions were not prejudiced by the 
elevation of one experiment over the others. 
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 Isaac Newton consciously set out to develop a literary technology of his own with 
which he would be able exhibit a higher degree of certainty for his claims than was 
deemed acceptable by Boyle. The mathematical tradition Newton looked to link with 
experimental science stressed the generality of experiment and sought to place it within a 
carefully articulated theory.55 English natural philosophers “had abandoned the demand 
for certain scientific knowledge and developed the alternative concept of probable 
knowledge.”56 Indeed, this lack of certain knowledge was Thomas Hobbes’ primary 
criticism of Boyle’s method.57 Boyle, however, did not regard the “probabilistic 
conception of physical knowledge” to have been “a regrettable retreat from more 
ambitious goals”; instead, it was a “wise rejection of failed dogmatism.”58 Newton 
conspicuously took a position that was at odds with this view and rejected that whatever 
was explained in philosophy were hypotheses that differed only in degree of probability. 
What Newton was attempting to do was develop an experimental approach that could 
both attain the level of certainty possible in mathematics and remain firmly located 
within the experimental context. He could not abide by a philosophy that rendered 
matters of fact to be only probably true, at the same time; however, he sharply criticized 
Gottfried Leibniz in 1715 for preferring “hypotheses to arguments of induction drawn 
from experiments.”59 Newton had concluded when he composed the “New theory,” that 
the only ways to publish without causing “unnecessary dispute” were to use a 
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mathematical format and to treat a ray of light as “an abstract mathematical entity defined 
merely by its degree of refrangibility.”60 It was not a matter of Newton failing to follow 
protocol; instead, he was actively seeking to re-orient natural philosophy in order to 
obtain greater certainty.  
 While Shapin regarded Boyle as having “exhibited the proper means by which 
legitimate knowledge was to be generated and evaluated,” Shapin's analysis cannot be 
applied equally to Newton.61 According to Shapin, Boyle “did not take on the identity of 
experimental philosopher, he was a major force in making that identity.”62 However, 
Newton quickly supplanted Boyle's position as the embodiment of the experimental 
natural philosopher and Newton's authority defined much of the eighteenth century. 
Shapin's analysis only works for natural philosophy “that rested on discrete, singular 
experiences presented historically”—the kind of experimental philosophy promoted by 
Boyle.63 Furthermore, Shapin presumed a natural philosophical community composed 
entirely of gentleman virtuosos. As Peter Dear has contended, “Boylean experimental 
philosophy was not the high road to modern experimentalism; it was a detour.”64 Boyle 
did not represent the typical natural philosopher and possessed personal characteristics, 
particularly in terms of his social status, that made him an anomalous figure in 
experimental philosophy after the 1660s. As such, I look to expand on Dear's argument 
that “Newton's work retrospectively validated the experimental program that Boyle had 
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advocated,” reconstituting it in mathematical terms, thereby giving English experimental 
philosophy “a way of representing their activity as experimentally meaningful.”65 By 
examining Newton's early efforts at developing his own literary technology, I show the 
way in which he was actively seeking to re-orient natural philosophy in a way that would 
allow it to adopt mathematical certainty and philosophic universality while maintaining 
the concrete reality of the discrete event. 
It is typical to characterize Newton as having been disinterested in public 
approval. On a superficial level, his reluctance to publish or make his theories widely 
known would seem to give credence to such a view. He certainly did not accord 
witnessing with anything like the same significance as Boyle did. Indeed, “rather than to 
any credible gentlemen who might be able to vouch for his claims,” Newton's 
correspondence referred “to a stock of private treatises and mathematical discoveries.”66 
He was of the view that “What's done before many witnesses is seldome without some 
further concern then that for truth;” instead, “what passes between friends in private 
usually deserves ye name of consultation rather then contest.”67 Rather than public 
disputes, Newton requested that “If there be any thing els in my papers in wch [Hooke] 
apprehend I have assumed too much, or not done you right, if you please to reserve your 
sentiments of it to private letter.” Newton promised that if Hooke did so he would find 
Newton not to be “so much in love wth philosophical productions but yt I can make them 
yeild to equity & friendship.”68 
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Isaac Newton, ultimately, was a mathematician. Alan Shapiro has argued that 
Newton developed his Lectiones opticae in order to construct a mathematical model of 
colour.69 The optical lectures served to provide the large experimental basis for the 
conclusions Newton presented in the “New theory.” Newton began by defending his 
treatment of colour mathematically saying: 
But lest I seem to have exceeded the bounds of my position while I 
undertake to treat the nature of colors, which are thought not to pertain to 
mathematics, it will not be useless if I again recall the reason for this 
pursuit. The relation between the properties of refractions and those of 
colors is certainly so great that they cannot be explained separately. 
Whoever wishes to investigate either one properly must necessarily 
investigate the other. Moreover, if I were not discussing refractions, my 
investigation of them would not then be responsible for my undertaking to 
explain colors; nevertheless, the generation of colors includes so much 
evidence, that for their sake I can thus attempt to extend the bounds of 
mathematics somewhat, just as astronomy, geography, navigation, optics, 
and mechanics are truly considered mathematical sciences even if they 
deal with physical things...although colors may belong to physics, the 
science of them must nevertheless be considered mathematical...I hope to 
show—as it were, by my example—how valuable mathematics is in 
natural philosophy.70 
 
Newton finally gave up on a mathematical explanation of colour, attempted to suppress 
the lectures and in Opticks (1704) he only hinted at the scheme. Indeed, the bold 
assertions of the “New theory” were reduced to “My design in this Book is not to explain 
the Properties of Light by Hypothesis, but to propose and prove them by Reason and 
Experiment.”71 
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 Thomas Kuhn has contended that there were two distinct lines of Newtonian 
influence, one that can be traced from Principia and the other from Opticks. The 
suggestion being that the Principia is mathematical, while Opticks experimental. As 
Kuhn has explained, classical sciences were grouped together as mathematical while 
Baconian science was viewed as experimental.72 The primary idea suggested by Kuhn 
was to enforce a distinction between so-called classical sciences and Baconian sciences 
and to emphasize an English exceptionalism, which saw it rapidly adopt Baconian and 
utilitarian science at the expense of the mathematical. This notion of a distinct division 
between English and continental philosophy, as described by Kuhn, is overly simplistic 
as has been demonstrated by Peter Dear in his discussion of mixed mathematics. 
An example Dear used to show the difference between continental natural 
philosophy and that of the Royal Society was Blaise Pascal and the famed ascent of Puy-
de-Dôme by Pascal's brother-in-law Périer. This experiment involved taking barometer 
measurements at increasing elevations in order to show the correlation between altitude 
and air pressure.73 While Boyle strongly criticized Pascal for insufficiently establishing 
that his experiments were actually carried out, Dear has argued that Boyle failed to 
understand the paradigm in which Pascal operated. Baconian science was concerned with 
singular experience. In contrast, for Pascal and his continental contemporaries, natural 
philosophy “took the form of universal statements” from which specific ideas about the 
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world could be derived.74 The Boylean notion of the singular experience was to rely on 
fallible historical reports that “were not public, but known only to a privileged few.”75 
While Boyle eschewed the use of mathematics in natural philosophy, for 
philosophers such as Pascal, “mathematics appeared as one of the few refuges of eternal 
verity untainted by the possibility of dissent, while all around them the natural world 
displayed a variety of impenetrability that mocked attempts at framing it.”76 Interestingly, 
this same recognition of the variety of the natural world was seen by Boyle as an 
argument in favour of Baconian science.77  The kind of “historical report[s] of a specific 
event” about which “Boyle wrote endlessly, would have been scientifically meaningless” 
to Pascal.78 Unlike Kuhn, however, Dear did not make a complete distinction between 
continental philosophy and English philosophy. He has traced a direct link between the 
mathematical philosophy as practiced by Pascal with the mixed mathematics of Isaac 
Newton. A key link was John Wilkins who “hoped to spread the new mathematical 
approach to mechanics to the general public.”79 According to Dear, it was the 
“mathematical argument in making accredited knowledge of nature show how the 
foundational assumptions of a mathematical science, and the kinds of experiences that 
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underwrote them” that “made it possible for Newton to announce a kind of declaration of 
independence for physico-mathematics.”80 
 Boyle extrapolated in detail on his experiments and methodology and included 
descriptions of failed experiments in order to enhance his credibility. Newton took 
essentially the opposite approach. Newton tried to purge from his writing all conjecture 
and information that he deemed not to be experimentally certain or relevant.81 He insisted 
that experimental philosophers “not mingle conjectures with certainties.”82 Thus, he drew 
a sharp distinction between hypothesis and experimental facts. Such a contention that 
hypotheses not be mingled with demonstrated principles led to the presentation of his 
theory in a “stark, nearly unintelligible form” that generated confusion for his readers.83 
He responded indignantly to Pardies that: 
I am content that the Reverend Father calls my theory an hypothesis if it 
has not yet been proved to his satisfaction. But my design was quite 
different, and it seems to contain nothing else than certain properties of 
light which, now discovered, I think are not difficult to prove, and which 
if I did not know to be true, I should prefer to reject as vain and empty 
speculation, than acknowledge them as my hypothesis.84 
 
For Newton, his 'theory' was better than Hooke's 'hypothesis' because Hooke's 
explanation lacked sufficient variables to account for all of the observed phenomena, a 
flaw that Newton asserted his own theory did not share.85 In his writing Boyle had sought 
to demonstrate his credibility and authority through the provision of detailed narratives. 
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Newton, in contrast, based his authority upon the mathematical certainty of his theory 
and the careful separation of the experimentally proven from the hypothesis. Zev Bechler 
has further pointed to the bluntness of Newton's style as being intentional. Newton's first 
response to Hooke was one of four drafts that he composed. The first draft was three 
times the length of that which was ultimately published and “except for some minor 
improvements, he aimed mainly to sharpen the bite and aggressiveness of his style.”86 
 Newton’s experimental facts themselves went largely unchallenged in England. 
Henry Guerlac has suggested that this was because Hooke had tried and accepted them as 
valid.87 This was not the case on the continent where Newton’s crucial experiment 
remained an object of dispute well into the eighteenth century. Initially, the problem was 
that Newton’s description of the experiment was too obscure and he had failed to provide 
sufficient details as to how monochromatic rays were produced or “how to prove that 
color and refrangibility are indissolubly linked.”88 Even with the expanded explanations 
provided by Newton in his correspondence during the disputes in the 1670s and again in 
Opticks, the experiment remained problematic because it did not actually work exactly as 
Newton claimed. This was ‘proven’ conclusively by Edme Marriotte’s attempt at 
replicating Newton’s experiment. According to Guerlac, Marriotte “found the emerging 
violet rays tinged with red and yellow.” Marriotte concluded the rays “had been altered or 
‘modified’ by their passage through the second prism” and it was “evident” that “a given 
portion of light receives different colors as a result of different modifications, and that the 
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ingenious hypothesis of Mr. Newton should not be admitted.”89 Newton had been 
satisfied that his experiments strongly suggested to him his conclusion—even if it did not 
technically work to perfection. Those already inclined to oppose him were not persuaded. 
As Guerlac has explained, Newton distinguished between the “factual discovery” of the 
crucial experiment and the theory of colour.90 Despite Newton’s use of the term crucial 
experiment, he recognized that further experiment was required to demonstrate his 
doctrine and in July of 1672 he wrote to Oldenberg to suggest eight “Quaeries” to be 
investigated by further experiments.91 His opponents, however, believed that the 
experimentum crucis, as Newton described it, “alone would suffice to prove or disprove 
Newton’s doctrine.”92 
To say that Newton did not care whether or not his facts were accepted would 
seem to be untenable given the vigor with which he defended the “New theory.” When he 
set about introducing his theory to the public for the first time in 1672, he consciously 
sought to structure his report in a fashion that would heighten its authority.  According to 
Peter Dear, in the “New theory” “Newton had taken pains to cast the piece in the correct 
mold, so that it should carry the proper weight,” even though the experience he recorded 
was a “fabrication.”93 Newton had invented such a historical narrative for his experiment 
because that was the convention at the time for reporting matters of fact.94 By writing the 
“New theory” the way he did, Newton hoped to strengthen the credibility of his theory by 
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presenting it to his audience in a familiar form. When he failed to achieve consensus, he 
adapted his approach. He provided more details of the experimentum crucis and better 
explained his theory.95 When this too failed, Newton bitterly removed himself from the 
philosophic discourse and cloistered himself at Cambridge. Newton had come out of a 
mathematical tradition which “privileged the right of a mathematician to keep his work 
private and to develop the fruits of his labours in private.”96 He exploited this as an 
excuse to save himself from further debate. As well, by this point he was more interested 
in studying alchemy and scriptural hermeneutics, which he was disinclined to take public 
for obvious reasons.97  
When Newton was finally brought out of isolation to publish the Principia in 
1687, he did so with an entirely new literary technology that was more closely aligned 
with mathematics while still maintaining a strong focus on physical experiment. As Dear 
has suggested with his notion of physico-mathematical philosophy, Newton’s method was 
as much or more a product of as it was part of Baconian tradition. Rather than having 
been a failed attempt by Newton to meet the conventions of his time, in the “New theory” 
Newton was in fact trying to subvert the conventions in order to promote his own model 
of mathematical natural philosophy. Indeed, according to Alan Shapiro, “Newton was as 
concerned with reforming the methods of natural science as with the science itself.”98 
Though he might have failed with the “New theory,” it was merely the first attempt by 
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Newton. He learned from the experience and was much more successful when he 
published his theory of gravitation. 
In the third chapter I argue that the primary issue at hand during the optical 
controversies was the problem of reception. Thus far I have retained a relatively top-
down discussion of knowledge transmission; however, rather than communicated 
exclusively down from the elite, knowledge is more usefully conceptualized as being 
circulated. The scientific audience plays a critical role in the process by which an 
experimental report becomes a matter of ‘fact’ because it is the audience that gives 
scientific facts ‘meaning.’ As such, I begin to take up Jim Secord's challenge to historians 
of science to explore how knowledge was transmitted back to the ‘centre’ from the 
periphery and address the question of reception and the role of the scientific audience.99 
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Chapter Three: 
A Seat More Convenient for Persons of Quality: The Problem of Reception and the 
Location of Authority 
 
“Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night; 
God said, “Let Newton be!” and all was light” 
-Alexander Pope, Epitaph Intended for Sir Isaac Newton 
 
When Isaac Newton became president of the Royal Society in 1703, the Society 
had suffered from years of neglect and administrative disorganization. Amongst his most 
pressing concerns was the Society’s imminent eviction from Gresham College so that it 
could undergo renovations. In an effort to secure new, suitable quarters for the Society, 
Newton composed a letter to Queen Anne requesting funds. He contended that a space 
was necessary for the Royal Society to be able to carry out its mission arguing that “a 
seat nearer Westminster would be more convenient for persons of Quality & render ye 
meetings more numerous & thereby conduce more of the improvement of natural 
knowledge.”1 Newton clearly considered natural philosophy to be an elite enterprise in 
which the proper audience was socially exclusive.
2
 However, Newton had expressed a 
rather different view in a 1676 letter to Robert Hooke. Instead, Newton eschewed the 
‘public’ experiments in the Royal Society. He argued that it was preferable for natural 
philosophy to be conducted via “private correspondence.” After all, he stated, “what’s 
done before many witnesses is seldome wthout some further concern then that for truth: 
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but what passes between friends in private usually deserves ye name of consultation 
rather than contest.”3 
By the eighteenth century, when the letter to Queen Anne was written, Newton had 
secured his own audience, which had been part of his purpose when writing the “New 
theory.” Thus, the 1670s optical disputes should be seen as a problem of reception and as 
part of Newton's difficult process of establishing control over his audience. Fundamental 
to the dispute was Newton’s pronouncement of the solution to a ‘fatal’ flaw in previous 
optical theories. According to Newton the shape of the spectrum that the crucial 
experiment demonstrated was fundamental problem that a successful theory of light and 
colour had to account for; however, no one before Newton had even noticed this 
supposedly critical problem. Newton failed to recognize that he had come to his theory 
gradually and not as an immediate revelation as the “New theory” suggested. Since 
Newton was relatively unknown, the onus was on him to prove the validity of his work. 
As Larry Stewart has observed: 
The refraction of Newton’s sunbeams revealed that written reports alone 
could not guarantee assent. It was not necessarily the experiment that was 
crucial of itself but the audience at the event or at its replication.
4
 
 
The audience one commanded played a crucial role in one’s ability to obtain credibility, 
which was critical for an idea to be received as desired. Newton accepted the social 
exclusivity for natural philosophy held by Robert Boyle. Indeed, he went further than 
Boyle who was a constant advocate for a natural philosophy that was open and 
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accessible.
5
 Perhaps due to his mathematical background, Newton was more concerned 
with the ‘truth’ of matters of fact than that a new science was open to the public.6 
Furthermore, Newton sought to separate personal status from experimental facts. In this 
chapter I use the question of reception in order to investigate the role of the audience and 
the location of authority in the making of knowledge in Newton's natural philosophy. I 
argue that the crucial aspect of Newton’s philosophical method was an experimental 
philosophy that saw experiment as ‘objective’ and entirely separated from the status and 
authority of the natural philosopher. 
A critical aspect of science that is only just beginning to be truly recognized is the 
scientific audience. Not only does science have an audience, but, because science does 
not end “where other forms of culture” begin, the scientific audience is not passive.7 It 
plays a role that is not only active but essential to the making of scientific knowledge.
8
 
As Stewart has observed, “the audience has been undervalued, but audience did not 
merely absorb.”9 Elsewhere, he has noted that “audiences were the mirror in which 
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replication was confirmed.”10 Constitution of experimental knowledge was to be a public 
process.
11
 The role of the audience was more than just that of confirming matters of fact. 
Stewart has proposed the term “feedback loop” to describe how “the public became 
essential to a process of circulation, a feedback loop that lasted as long as it had 
something to offer and questions to ask.”12 When studies regarding science and public 
culture are taken into account, it becomes clear that the role of the audience cannot be 
restricted to relationships of patronage or elite dissemination.
13
 I wish to conceive of the 
audience broadly in order to consider the audience for seventeenth-century scientific 
texts, which, as Simon Schaffer has noted, are used by scientists “as knowledge 
producing tools.”14 Texts and audience are fundamentally interrelated in the operation of 
science; therefore, it is essential that a study of literary technology also recognize the 
audience. 
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions marked a crucial moment for 
the historiography of science. It paved the way for the history of science to be wrested 
away from the domain of scientists to that of social sciences and humanities.
15
 According 
to Kuhn, the traditional view of science was that it is cumulative and each successive 
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discovery and theory is built on previous work in a clear procession to the present. 
Scientists have tended to assume “scientific knowledge is the crowning achievement of 
human reason.”16 Following from Kuhn has been an argument, by those historians of 
science Jan Golinski has termed “constructivists,” that scientific knowledge is not 
‘discovered,’ absolutely objective knowledge. Instead, it is constructed based on a 
specific set of exterior elements such as social relationships, geography and politics.
17
 
Bruno Latour, in particular, has recognized the central role that scientific 
publications play in “fabricating” or, to use a less pejorative word, “constructing” facts.18 
He has argued that in order for a paper to be turned into fact it must be both read and 
responded to.19 An article without engagement cannot be fact; science is inherently 
communicative.20 It cannot be fact without communication because it is the interaction 
that gives it meaning. Latour has, thus, usefully noted the importance of the “flow of 
objects and concepts through the network of participating allies and social worlds.”21 His 
approach, however, has focused on the “translation of the concerns of the non-scientist 
into those of the scientist” in a way that is ultimately “kind of funneling” to use Susan 
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Leigh Star and James Greisemer’s description of Latour’s actor-network model.22 For 
Latour the role of the non-scientist is limited to providing concerns for the scientist to 
‘translate.’ Similarly, Simon Schaffer has regarded the audience something that was to be 
manipulated and controlled by natural philosophers.23 Such a model fails to recognize 
fully the part played by the audience. Science cannot operate without the audience 
because it is the audience that gives it authority and credibility. As Andrea Rusnock has 
noted, “publishing a paper meant that the ‘public,’ whoever that might be, would be 
responsible for evaluating its content.”24 She has expanded on Michael Hunter’s 
argument that the Royal Society “developed as a legitimating body…for scientific 
reports” in order to propose that correspondence was the Society’s primary role.25 Letters 
allowed for a more flexible and participatory science than did the Philosophical 
Transactions. The audience did more than legitimate specific matters of fact; it ultimately 
was needed to legitimize the scientific method itself. Furthermore, I argue that the 
process of legitimization served to shape natural philosophy.26 
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The early Royal Society of Robert Boyle had “no clear way forward to making 
universal knowledge about the structure of nature.”27 Newton sought to solve this 
problem. Hunter has argued that the understood role of the Royal Society was “to 
validate the work of others.”28 One of the major social roles it performed was to enforce 
the experimental method as the means of establishing matters of fact. It must be 
remembered, however, that the experimental method was by no means secured as the best 
way of learning about the world in the seventeenth century.
29
 Indeed, one of the reasons 
why Newton’s optical controversies have been of such interest to historians of science is 
the way in which the disputes crucially were about how experimentation itself ought to be 
carried out. The optical controversies “showed how hard it was for Newton to achieve 
authority over his ‘publick.’”30 
Newton’s optical disputes were centrally an issue of reception. As Latour has 
contended, for a proof to be proven decisive “there must be more than one actor.”31 
Reception is therefore of crucial importance to the scientific project. This is most clearly 
seen with the crucial experiment. The Lèige experimentalists and Robert Hooke 
perceived the “New theory” in fundamentally different ways. Robert Hooke rejected that 
the crucial experiment was, in fact, a crucial experiment; therefore, much of the dispute 
between him and Newton focused on Newton’s attempt to demonstrate that it was one. 
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The Lèige Jesuits never questioned that the experimentum crucis was actually such an 
experiment. Because of this, they concentrated their efforts on challenging Newton’s 
matters of fact. The distinction is important. Since Hooke rejected the cruciality of the 
experiment, he was able to accept it as a true report of an experiment while denying 
Newton’s theory. Newton’s Liège opponents, by contrast, sought to disprove Newton’s 
theory by showing that his crucial experiment itself was wrong. 
In the Liège dispute, Lucas and Linus attempted to follow protocol and were 
quick to point out that their experiments had been performed before many witnesses. As 
John Gascoines wrote to Newton: 
For [Linus] hath try’d it again and again, and he called divers on purpose to 
see it, nor ever made difficulty to shew to any one, who either by chaunce 
came to his chamber as he was doing it, or shewed the least desire to see that 
same…we think it probable he hath tried his experiment thrice for Mr 
Newton’s once.32 
 
Newton, however, was not impressed. While Linus may have performed his experiments 
before witnesses, the credibility of these observers was questionable from an English 
perspective as they were generally Jesuits and/or Cartesians. Furthermore, Newton 
criticized Linus for relying on “old Expts” and long-dead witnesses.33 Newton may not 
have held witnessing with quite the same regard as did Boyle, but he still recognized that 
it played a significant role in the verification of experimental facts. Ultimately, “ye 
business being about matter of fact was not proper to be decided by writing but by trying 
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it before competent witnesses.”34 This preface of competent was critical as the witnesses 
provided by Linus were not as far as Newton was concerned. It was not enough that an 
experiment was witnessed; who the witnesses were also mattered. 
Boyle, Steven Shapin has claimed, embodied the ‘new science’ more than any 
other early experimentalist. Moreover, he “did not take on the identity of experimental 
philosopher, he was a major force in making that identity.”35 However, Isaac Newton 
quickly supplanted Boyle as the embodiment of the experimental natural philosopher and 
Newton’s authority defined much of the eighteenth century. This thesis has sought to 
chart the transition from Boylean to Newtonian natural philosophy. Crucial to this shift 
was the role accorded to social status. For Boyle, credibility and gentility were all but 
interchangeable. To be a natural philosopher was to be a gentleman. Indeed, Shapin 
demonstrates this succinctly by pointing out that Robert Hooke was not a gentleman and, 
as such, was not considered by his contemporaries to have been a natural philosopher. 
Even Hooke seldom referred to himself as such.
36
 
Much scholarship has been devoted to trying to define just what made one a 
gentlemen.
37
 In the English Christian conception of gentility, a “gentleman is a Man of 
himself,” on “that is God’s Servant, the World’s Master, and his own man.”38 His “own 
man” was key. Ultimately, the status of a gentleman is most crudely reduced to wealth 
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and blood, or, more cynically, that one is a gentleman because other gentlemen say one 
is. Yet, wealth did not make one a gentleman so much as it afforded one the freedom to 
be one. To be a gentleman was not to be beholden to anyone, which required enough 
wealth to be independent. A gentleman was one for whom others worked who “could be 
recognized for his idleness.”39 Robert Boyle carried out his experiments because of an 
innate curiosity and not for any income, while Robert Hooke and Isaac Newton 
maintained a professional employment that precluded genteel status. 
The relevant question, however, is not what made one a gentleman, but what did 
it mean to be a gentleman? Why did being one matter? That it did matter is evident by the 
great deal of attention given to it. Gentility, Shapin suggests, mattered because it was 
perceived as a “Golden Mean,” as an ‘ideal’ of morality in society.40 This was not to say 
that gentlemen were necessarily more virtuous than the rest of society, just that their 
position in society offered an opportunity for a virtuous life not available to others of 
lesser social status. By the mid-seventeenth century, the notion of the gentleman reflected 
a society in flux. Philip Carter has suggested an idea of ‘gentlemen’ that evolved to 
mirror the growing social mobility of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
According to Carter, to be a gentleman was an ideal of politeness and refinedness. It was 
no longer tied to matters of birth; instead, there was a: 
“redeployment of titles—‘Mr’ and ‘Mrs’/’gentleman’ and ‘lady’—from 
individuals who traditionally occupied specific positions and performed 
specific social duties to anyone, regardless of profession or social 
background, laying ‘claim to a degree of rank and respectability.’41 
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In a world where one was able to better one’s station in life, “concept of gentle manliness 
[was] based as much on personality as on birth.”42 The rather traditional notion of 
gentlemanliness that Boyle emphasized was, in many ways, becoming a thing of the past 
by the time that Boyle rose to prominence. 
According to Barbara Shapiro, John Wilkins—who was a founding member of the 
Royal Society—saw science to be a “leisure-time occupation with some practical 
application” for the socially elite.43 Usefulness was applauded, but served only a 
tangential purpose. Similarly, Boyle’s conception of the Christian virtuoso often 
relegated utility to be merely a happy by-product. Gentlemen required morally 
appropriate activities and natural philosophy offered just such. It might have also allowed 
for mechanical or practical improvements in daily life, but its purpose, for Boyle, was 
theological at its core. Steven Shapin has contended that Boyle sought to defend natural 
philosophy by following “the general drift of late Tudor and Stuart Christian moralism in 
arguing for the necessity of discipline and vocation.”44 Boyle argued that all men required 
a calling as it was a “souueraigne Preseruatiue agenst Idleness.”45 This suggests that 
Boyle was more concerned with the production of virtue than he was with what would be 
regarded as ‘scientific’ accomplishment today. After all, “avoidance of idleness was both 
a divine obligation and a way of achieving virtue.”46 If Gentlemen did not have morally 
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appropriate activities they would “make vacation their only vocation” and to be an idle 
man was to be “the most inexcusable of All men.”47 Natural philosophy offered an ideal 
diversion from idleness. Frequent dispute or mistrust would have been inherently 
inappropriate for such a moral enterprise. 
Boyle assumed a certain moral superiority to be possessed by gentlemen. Carter 
has argued that there was an idea “that changes in personal conduct were determined by 
one’s socio-economic environment.”48 Carter’s argument lends credence to Shapin’s 
proposition that Boyle’s regard for gentility was widespread in seventeenth century 
Britain. From a standpoint of ‘scientific’ advancement, the Society would have benefitted 
from attempting to recruit into its numbers members of the trades. Indeed, one of its first 
projects was an ultimately abortive “History of Trades.”49 However, the Society instead 
actively kept itself a highly elite institution.
50
 The History failed in part because “artisans 
were not sufficiently conversant with the arcana of gentlemen philosophers.”51 Following 
arguments that have been made by Margaret Jacob and James Jacob, one might derive the 
position that the leading members of the Society saw it as serving an essentially political 
purpose rather than a ‘scientific’ one.52  
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The notion of the gentleman was fundamental to Boyle’s writing. He routinely 
made reference to this or that ‘ingenious’ gentleman and the matters of fact they had 
reported to him. An interesting early example can be found in the correspondence 
between Boyle and his early mentor Samuel Hartlib during the 1650s, during which time 
Hartlib was suffering significantly from the stone and was experimenting with various 
possible treatments. In his descriptions of different cures Hartlib generally provides 
Boyle with the name of the gentleman or gentlewoman from whom he had been given the 
medicine. For instance, he described how “gentlewoman” had “assured me, upon her own 
knowledge” that a “young gentlewoman” and an “ancient gentleman” had been cured “by 
the only use of Turkish drink coffee.”53 Boyle continued to maintain an interest in 
medicine throughout his life. He was frequently consulted by physicians and was forever 
testing different treatments, many of which were rather more superstitious than medicinal 
by modern standards. As G.W. Jones saw it, Boyle’s “gullibility and credulity” appear as 
distinct features of his medical writings.
54
 This would seem odd considering his esteemed 
status as a chemist and the regard he held for skepticism and experimental rigour; 
however, Jones did not consider how Boyle understood credibility. Boyle took medical 
advice from people whose status indicated a degree of trustworthiness. Furthermore, a 
suggested medicine could not be judged without being tried; however, many of the more 
esoteric remedies Boyle described he was not in a position to test personally. 
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When it came to experimental philosophy Boyle was less credulous and generally 
did not transmit matters of fact, at least without reservations, that had been reported to 
him without confirming the experiments himself if they seemed too spectacular. An 
example of this can be found in his essay “Of the Intestine Motions Of the Particles of 
Quiescent Solids.” In this essay he described how “an ingenious Gentleman of my 
acquaintance” had told him “he had a Turquois-stone, which if he were not mistaken had 
a wonderful property, for there being in it several spots of Colours differing from the rest 
of the Gem, these spots seem'd, though very slowly, to move from one part of the stone to 
the other.”55 In order “to ascertain my self of the truth of it,” Boyle borrowed the stone to 
observe the phenomena. Once in possession of the stone, he employed an “ingenious 
youth” to keep watch on the stone and draw occasional pictures of the spots moving. 
After several weeks of observation, it was “unanimously concluded” that the spots did 
indeed move.
56
 Such testimony was insufficient for Christiaan Huygens, who wrote to 
Henry Oldenburg that he “should require some very authentic and carefully verified 
attestations to it.”57 Oldenburg’s response was simply to reassert Boyle’s assurances that 
the observations had been made in “good faith,” having been witnessed by Hooke 
“amongst others,” and to remind Huygens of Boyle’s status.58 As Steven Shapin has 
argued, status also played an important role with whom one was allowed to argue. 
                                                 
55
 Boyle, “Essay Of the Intestine Motions Of the Particles of Quiescent Solids,” in Works, vol. VI, 201. 
56
 Boyle, “Quiescent Solids,” 202. 
57
 Christiaan Huygens to Henry Oldenburg, 12 January, 1670, in The Correspondence of Henry Oldenburg, 
vol. VI, edited by A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 
426. 
58
 Oldenburg to Huygens, 31 January, 1670, in Correspondence of Henry Oldenburg, 460. See also Shapin, 
Social History of Truth, 293. 
81 
 
Oldenburg was careful to remind those who might forget the rules of comportment “that 
publicly expressed distrust might be consequential.”59 
A gentleman such as Robert Boyle was to be considered inherently trustworthy 
because he did not stand to gain anything personally from the matters of fact he reported. 
Boyle’s social standing ultimately had as much to do with his birth and personal wealth 
as it did his ability as a natural philosopher. His participation in experimental philosophy 
was a matter of personal and genuine curiosity. The inference that Boyle expected his 
audience to make was that he was trustworthy because he had no reason to lie—unlike 
someone of lesser status who may have been seeking to advance their career or to benefit 
financially. In fact, Boyle made a similar argument as to why those of sufficiently low 
social status might also be trustworthy sources of information. Such individuals 
possessed neither the means to profit from the facts they reported nor the philosophic 
knowledge necessary for theoretical speculation. Thus, according to Boyle at least, they 
were limited to reporting what they actually saw. For example, Boyle regarded reports 
from pearl divers regarding the effects of water pressure as credible.
60
 Servants, on the 
other hand, held a rather more complicated position. They could be “distrusted 
costlessly,” thereby performing the useful task of protecting the integrity of the 
gentleman experimentalist.
61
 In the case of experimental failure, Boyle often sought to 
demonstrate that it was his assistant who was to blame, which was often the only time 
that Boyle acknowledged them at all in his writing.
62
 As Shapin has shown, to reject a 
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gentleman of science’s reported fact was to question his authority and, by extension to 
call into question the entire basis of natural philosophy.
63
 
Ironically, Robert Hooke would seem to have been just the sort of person that, 
according to Boyle’s logic, would have been the least trustworthy. Hooke was highly 
knowledgeable, and thus able to develop complex theories which depended on the truth 
of his reported matters of fact. Even more damning, however, Hooke derived his status 
almost entirely from his role as an experimental expert.
64
 Furthermore, he was intimately 
engaged with the trades, which Boyle suggested to be an unreliable source of knowledge, 
and Hooke aggressively sought material gain from his discoveries.
65
 Hooke did not have 
the advantage of status. In order to compensate for this ‘deficiency,’ he emphasized his 
position as an expert. When he wrote that “for all the expts & obss: I have hitherto made” 
and he that “did not take up” his theory “without first trying some hundreds of expts” 
Hooke was reminding his audience that he had long experience as an experimental 
philosopher.
66
 He was the one with the established credentials while Newton was the 
lowly upstart who needed to prove himself. As both assistant to Boyle and curator of 
experiments for the Royal Society, Hooke had had the opportunity to demonstrate his 
prowess before many of Europe’s leading natural philosophers. His social status, 
however, was tenuous and his position was defined according to his relationship with 
those upon whom he was dependent.
67
 The ambiguity of his station left him frequently 
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feeling abused by his socially superior fellows at the Royal Society who often saw fit to 
call his work into question when it suited them or to make demands on him that he felt 
beneath his expertise.
68
 Despite the fact that Hooke was “perhaps the only essential 
member of the Society,” he was consistently treated as a “paid employee.”69 At the same 
time, however, his standing as a skilled experimentalist was never in question. 
While Hooke was an established and well-known member of the scientific 
community, Isaac Newton was an obscure mathematics professor with few public 
credentials. With this in mind Hooke’s infamous intimation that “Mr. Newton had taken” 
Hooke’s “hypothesis of the puls or wave” can be considered in a rather different light.70 
Rather than concentrating on the accusation of plagiarism or on Hooke’s disingenuous 
representation of Newton’s theory (which was not a pulse or wave theory at all), I wish to 
point to the way in which Hooke was seeking to emphasize that he had been there first; 
Newton was the latecomer. Newton’s work, Hooke suggested, was derived from 
experiments that Hooke had published years before. Hooke pronounced himself “well 
pleased to see those notions promoted and improved which I had long since began, but 
had not time to compleat.” Newton had “gone farther” to “compleat, rectify and reform… 
what were the sentiments of” Hooke’s “younger studies.”71 Newton, Hooke intimated, 
was simply providing an extension to what Hooke had already accomplished. Certainly 
Newton owed a debt to Hooke’s Micrographia; however, Newton’s “New theory” was 
entirely original. While he was inspired by some of the observations that Hooke had 
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described, Newton used very different instruments and techniques and came to 
conclusions that were highly dissimilar to those of Hooke.  
Boyle located scientific authority in the social status of the person reporting 
matters of fact. Hooke continued to emphasize the status of the practitioner; however, he 
focused on his publicly acknowledged expertise to defend his theory. Newton, on the 
other hand, sought to place the authority of his facts within the facts themselves. His were 
not credible because of his status, but because they were ‘objective’ statements about 
reality. His theory was “not an Hypotheses but most rigid consequence…evinced by ye 
mediation of experiments concluding directly & without any suspicion of doubt.”72 
Newton’s conception of authority anticipated the scientific objectivity Lorraine Daston 
and Peter Galison described as being a product of the nineteenth century. They defined 
objectivity as “to aspire to knowledge that bears no trace of the knower—knowledge 
unmarked by prejudice or skill, fantasy or judgment, wishing or striving.”73 Daston and 
Galison sought to make a strict, epistemological argument which considered using 
‘objectivity’ as a historical category before the 1800s to be anachronistic.74 Both Lissa 
Roberts and Jan Golinski, however, have demonstrated that similar notions of objectivity 
were present in eighteenth century chemistry texts.
75
 The process by which science was 
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rendered ‘objective’ began with Newton and his physico-mathematical philosophy even 
if it was not technically termed as such at the time. 
As Shapin has argued, “Boyle’s repeated insistence that he had no theoretical 
investments and prepossessions” was part of his strategy to warrant that “he testified to 
truth alone.”76 Similarly, Boyle restrained himself from developing theoretical systems. 
He reported facts that were “the concrete and particular” rather than being caught up in 
the “abstract and the general.”77 Such lack of theoretical apparatus perhaps allowed him 
to get away with less stringent consideration for certainty. For Boyle what was important 
was that he reported experiments accurately. When Boyle or Hooke performed an 
experiment “they wished to see how nature would behave under previously unobserved, 
often previously nonexistent, circumstances” and not “demonstrate what was already 
known.
”78
 Newton, on the other hand, “selected and utilized [experiments] to elaborate 
theory.”79 He was not satisfied with simply providing experimental history; therefore, he 
demanded that his audience cede to his authority much more so than did Boyle. Boyle 
only asked that they accept that he reported accurately, while Newton expected them to 
agree with the theory he argued that his matters of fact demonstrated. 
When Newton criticised Anthony Linus for citing incompetent witnesses, it might 
seem to have been at odds with his rather derisive statement to Hooke regarding public 
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witnesses.
80
 Newton’s seemingly contradictory arguments could be read as simply taking 
whichever approach he deemed most convenient to attack his opponents; however, I wish 
to argue that Newton did, in fact, maintain a consistent position. Replication was the 
central issue for natural philosophy and perhaps for no one was this clearer than with 
Newton. Indeed, the question of replication is what makes the Liège dispute significant. 
Robert Boyle was able to accept that experiments could only be demonstrated to be 
probably true, something that Newton’s mathematical mind was unable to do. 
Experiments could not simply be the accounts of discrete events that Boyle described; 
instead, Newton sought to present his experiments more along the lines of a mathematical 
proof. The event was irrelevant. What mattered was an experiment was a repeatable 
incident that occurred outside of history. It was this view of experimental philosophy that 
caused Newton to put so much emphasis on the crucial experiment in the first place and 
led him to defend it at such length. 
Newton did not resolve the conflict created by the experimentum crucis; instead, 
that job fell to Hooke’s true heir and Newton’s protégée, J.T. Desaguliers. The primary 
means by which he would do so was by adapting the experiment so that the problems 
pointed to by dissenters were ‘fixed’ and then demonstrating the experiment before 
gentlemen and diplomats in both London and Paris.
81
 Newton’s original paper was 
insufficiently detailed for easy replication.
82
 As Desaguliers admitted “Some gentlemen 
abroad” had “complained that they had not found the Experiments answer, for want of 
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sufficient Directions.”83 It was essential that he demonstrate the crucial experiment 
without resorting to inside knowledge provided by Newton.
84
 While the “New theory” 
lacked the requisite details, Desaguliers was able to rely only on Newton’s publicly 
available accounts due to the additional resource of the Opticks, which had provided a 
method for separating monochromatic rays that had not been published “before Sir Is. 
Newton’s Opticks came abroad” in 1704.85 The experiment was much “less troublesome 
if it be made in such a manner as is described in the fourth Proposition of the first Book 
of Sir Is. Newton’s Opticks.”86 Such an approach also had the benefit of crediting the 
competency of the continental experimenters who had been unable to replicate Newton’s 
experiment. It was not because of “their wilful incompetence,” as Newton had insinuated, 
but because they simply lacked the necessary information.
87
 Desaguliers’ claim that he 
“had no other Directions” than what he found in the “New theory” and the Opticks was a 
fiction since he possessed direct access to Newton; however, it was effective in its 
purpose of ending the continental challenge to Newton’s credibility.88 
Desaguliers’ paper, published in the Philosophical Transactions in 1714, also 
showed significant differences from Newton’s approach. Desaguliers reported the 
experiments more descriptively and was more careful with his details than Newton had 
been. While he claimed that could “have referr’d the Reader altogether” to the Opticks, 
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Desaguliers’ account was successful in part because he finally provided enough 
information to replicate easily the crucial experiment.
89
 Unlike Newton, Desaguliers 
provided a large number of illustrations and took great care to describe the apparatus 
used. The improved description and provision of illustrations are examples of Desaguliers 
harnessing a more effective literary technology than had Newton. Even more important, 
however, was Desaguliers’ demonstration of the crucial experiment before witnesses. The 
authority of Desaguliers rested primarily on his brilliant manipulation of social 
technology. As Simon Schaffer has observed, Desaguliers “tailored his experiments for 
effective witnessing.”90 According to J.L Heilbron, when a group of French natural 
philosophers came to London in 1715, they “arrived prejudiced” against Newton, but 
“left Desaguliers’ neat show fully satisfied with Newton’s doctrine.”91 
The true strength of Desaguliers, according to I. Bernard Cohen, was Desaguliers’ 
ability to demonstrate Newtonian philosophy “without mathematics.”92 Desaguliers wrote 
for those “little versed in mathematical sciences”93 and, therefore, posited that the truth of 
Newtonian philosophy “is supported by mathematics, yet its physical discoveries may be 
communicated without.”94 Following Desaguliers’ efforts, the crucial experiment had 
been shown conclusively and was no longer a means by which detractors of Newton were 
able to attack him. Furthermore, he reconciled the demonstrability of Newton’s physical 
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experimental philosophy with the mathematical difficulty that had previously made 
Newton unapproachable. Much like Hooke, Desaguliers showed, rather than told, the 
matters of fact he wished to prove.
95
 
In 1718, Willem ‘sGravesande wrote to Newton to thank him for a copy of 
Optice, noting that: 
I have had some success in giving a taste of your philosophy in this 
University; as I talk to people who have made very little progress in 
mathematics I have been obliged to have several machines constructed to 
convey the force of propositions whose demonstrations they had not 
understood.
96
 
Similarly to Desaguliers, ‘sGravesande’s letter pointed to an “inversion of strength from 
seemingly incomprehensible rational demonstration to allegedly forceful experimental 
performance.”97 Public demonstration allowed ‘sGravesande to give “direct proof” of 
Newton’s philosophy.98 J.T Desaguliers asserted the authority of public demonstration 
over mathematics even more boldly. Newton’s mathematical demonstrations had served 
to provide the theoretical underpinnings of Newton’s philosophy; however, Desaguliers 
claimed that demonstration was enough to allow an audience to understand and 
participate in Newtonian philosophy. 
Desaguliers provided a crucial role for the Royal Society by tying “his public 
performance” to its needs and giving the general audience confidence in the experimental 
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method.
99
 Moreover, he completed the transition from Boyle’s to Newton’s conception of 
authority. Even more usefully to eighteenth-century natural philosophers, he did so while 
eliminating Newton’s emphasis on mathematics. Desaguliers chose to take seriously the 
Queries of Newton’s Opticks as important avenues of experimentation. In doing so he 
“also succeeded in transforming the meaning of Newtonianism” and, by extension, 
natural philosophy.
100
 By removing the mathematical veil that had obscured Newton’s 
philosophy, Desaguliers suggested that anyone could participate. The careful and 
complicated mathematical demonstrations that Newton had so much depended upon were 
no longer necessary or perhaps even relevant. Mathematics had been essential when 
Newton was establishing his credentials, but by the time Desaguliers rose to prominence 
Newton’s authority in England was all but absolute. The power of experimental facts no 
longer resided in gentility or even expert status per se; instead, facts were to be regarded 
as ‘objective’ statements about the world and they were visibly shown as such through 
public demonstration. 
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Conclusion 
“To Newton’s genius, and immortal fame 
Th’adventurous muse with trembling pinion soars” 
– Richard Glover1 
 Following his death in 1691, Robert Boyle’s will stipulated the establishment of 
an annual series of lectures intended “for proving the Christian religion against notorious 
infidels, viz, Atheists, Deists, Pagans, Jews, and Mahometans.”2 When Richard Bentley 
was to deliver the first of these lectures in 1692 he turned to Isaac Newton for assistance 
in using Newton’s system as evidence in favour of the Christian God. Newton wrote four 
letters to Bentley in response to his request. As Newton told Bentley, when he had 
composed the Principia he “had an eye upon such Principles as might work wth 
considering men for the beleife of a Deity.”3 Bentley was only the first of a number of 
lecturers who sought to use Newtonian philosophy in order to carry out Boyle’s purpose. 
These lectures were fundamental in “consolidating Newtonian ideology.”4 They played 
an important part in transforming the Principia from an incomprehensible work of 
natural philosophy into a philosophical model with profound implications for how the 
world would be understood in the eighteenth century.  
It was the Boyle Lectures, according to Margaret Jacob, that “created the 
Newtonian world view.”5 From that point forward, Newton could no longer be the 
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retiring scholar hidden away in Trinity College, Cambridge who saw “not what there is 
desirable in publick esteeme.”6 Though the conventional portrayal of Newton has been 
that he shunned fame, by the eighteenth century he had recognized the importance of 
developing a public image. Indeed, he sat for some twenty portraits and busts, many of 
which he paid for himself.
7
 Perhaps even more telling is the fact that there are no 
contemporary images of Robert Hooke. All that survived Hooke’s death in 1703 was 
Richard Waller’s rather negative description of Hooke’s physical appearance.8 While 
Newton went on to near deification, Hooke’s legacy quickly diminished. Partially due to 
a concerted effort by Newton, he was largely forgotten until historians rediscovered him 
in the mid-twentieth century.
9
 By the eighteenth century, it is apparent that Newton had 
learned the value of a carefully crafted public image. 
Following the disastrous results of the “New theory about light and colour,” 
Newton had recognized that it was not enough that his matters of fact be right or that his 
theory be superior. The eighteenth century was in many ways the Newtonian century. 
With the publication of the Principia, Newton had already begun a transformation into 
becoming the final authority on natural philosophy. From the many portraits he 
commissioned to the praises heaped on him by the likes of the poet Alexander Pope and 
the French Enlightenment philosophe Voltaire, Newton achieved an “almost God-like 
                                                 
6
 Isaac Newton to John Collins, 18 February 1669/70, in The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, vol. I, 
1661-1675, edited by Henry Turnbull (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 27. 
7
 Fara, 34. 
8
 Patri Pugliese, “Hooke, Robert (1635–1703),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, eee ed. H. C. 
G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2006; 
“Hooke’s Possessions at His Death: A Hitherto Unknown Inventory,” in Robert Hooke: New Studies, 
edited by Michael Hunter and Simon Schaffer (Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 1989), 287-8. 
9
 Michael Hunter and Simon Schaffer, “Introduction,” in Robert Hooke: New Studies, 3-4. 
93 
 
reputation” that left him a nearly unimpeachable authority for centuries following his 
death.
10
 After Newton became president of the Royal Society in 1703 he finally 
published a complete version of Opticks in 1704. Thereafter, his optical theory was 
increasingly regarded as canon. It was not seriously challenged in England until Thomas 
Young did so at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
11
 
The Newtonians of the eighteenth century extended Newton’s influence far 
beyond esoteric natural philosophy. Newton came to transcend the elite world of the 
Royal Society and permeated public culture. By the eighteenth century an appeal to 
Newtonian philosophy had become a primary strategy for securing credibility. Newtonian 
philosophy became iconic. For example, the fashionable doctor George Cheyne began his 
career by “aggressively” asserting his “iatromathematical,” Newtonian credentials as a 
means of “making himself known.”12 In 1733 Jacob Acworth, the chief surveyor of the 
Naval Board, proposed warship hull designs based on Newtonian principles. Similarly, 
mathematical writer and teacher William Emerson “advocated applying Galilean and 
Newtonian mechanical principles to the problems of navigation and naval architecture” in 
his “influential work.”13 In 1790s London, Newton was held up as a bastion of orthodoxy 
and a symbol of political stability during the Millenarian controversies William 
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Herschel’s famous forty foot reflector telescope had stirred up.14 Meanwhile those with 
Millenarian inclinations like Joseph Priestley “worked hard to modify the prevailing 
interpretations of Isaac Newton in order to make the connections between natural 
philosophy and Providence utterly transparent.”15 In the early nineteenth century both 
sides of a Cambridge theological dispute over whether or not to distribute bibles without 
the Book of Common Prayer attempted to establish their credibility by positioning 
themselves as Newtonian and their opponents as specifically not Newtonian.
16
 Ironically, 
Newton had become transformed into the very kind of blanket authority against which 
the Royal Society had been established to combat. The optical controversies Newton 
endured during the 1670s had played a crucial role in shaping his method and began the 
process of establishing Newtonianism in Britain. 
Through the close study of the dispute between Robert Hooke and Isaac Newton, 
we are able to appreciate the rhetorical methods used by scientists to establish their 
authority over the knowledge they produce. In this thesis I have analyzed the early 
development of Newton’s literary technology in order to demonstrate the process by 
which he sought to gain and maintain control of his theories and reputation. In the “New 
theory about light and colour” Newton challenged the authority of the Royal Society by 
suggesting and developing alternative conceptions of experimental credibility, 
mathematical certainty and dissemination. In order to avoid future disagreements, he 
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Cambridge,” History of Science 34 (1996): 167-200. 
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further developed his method for presenting his theories that established him as 
authoritative. 
In order for a theory to have any meaning, it needs to be accepted by the scientific 
community. What this also means is that science has an audience. The scientific audience 
has tended to be conceptualized in passive terms in which its sole role is receiving 
knowledge. However, it plays a crucial role because without the assent of the audience, 
science has no authority. The scientist does not merely transmit matters of fact to the 
audience, but instead it must be convinced. In this thesis I have argued the audience has 
played a key part in shaping scientific knowledge. In the case of Isaac Newton this is 
seen in the lessons he learned from the failure of “New theory about light and colour.” In 
the Principia, he presented his theory of universal gravitation in stark mathematical terms 
that rendered it almost entirely incomprehensible to his audience. This approach 
solidified his authority because it forced everyone to go through intermediaries if they 
were to understand it, allowing Newton to control his audience in a way that he had been 
unable to do with the more accessible “New theory.” Thus, the optical controversies 
played a key role that historians have hitherto failed adequately to recognize in the 
shaping of the rhetorical methodology of science. With the methodological innovations 
provided by Newtonian philosophy, the new experimental science was established as the 
means of ‘discovering’ natural knowledge during the eighteenth century. 
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